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 Abstract 
Jochen Hippler: Counterinsurgency and Political Control. US Military Strategies 
Regarding Regional Conflict. Duisburg: Institute for Development and Peace, 
University of Duisburg-Essen (INEF Report, 81/2006). 
With US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan fighting rather ruthless counter-
insurgency campaigns, the topic of insurgency and counterinsurgency is of 
pressing relevance. At the same time, questions of internal violence in develop-
ing countries have generally been high on the political and academic agenda in 
the context of “failed” and “failing states”. 
This paper describes and analyzes US military doctrines in regard to con-
trolling regional conflicts. It introduces the relevant US military approaches to 
the academic discourse. 
The focal points of analysis are the strategies and concepts of the US mili-
tary (mainly of the US Army and the US Marine Corps) in regard to counterin-
surgency. The links between military combat and non-combat operations of the 
armed forces and civilian policies are of special concern. 
In order to understand the US counterinsurgency strategies, this paper 
places them within  both a historical perspective and the context of the devel-
opment of military doctrine. It discusses the concepts of “Small Wars”, “Low-
Intensity Conflict” (LIC or “Low-Intensity Warfare”), “Military Operations 
Other than War” (MOOTW) and “Stability and Support Operations”, which all 
deal with questions of pro-insurgency, counterinsurgency and related topics. 
One of the results of the analyses is that the political and social aspects of coun-
terinsurgency are of key importance. The US armed forces are quite aware of 
this in principle, but to a surprising degree fail to transform this into opera-
tional concepts. Counterinsurgency is not a matter of military conquest, but of 
social control. And while the US Army and the Marine Corps clearly under-
stand this in principle, they often are at a loss as to how to achieve this on the 
ground. The political context, US governmental policies and the military culture 
often lead to practices contradicting key elements of the military doctrine. 
Insurgencies and counterinsurgencies are basically struggles for legiti-
macy, both locally and internationally, using political and military means. In a 
context of often unilateral or even imperial US foreign policy or policies of 
doubtful legality, the US armed forces may be militarily superior to all potential 
foes, but quite vulnerable in the competition for political legitimacy. 
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 1.  Introduction: 
Counterinsurgency as a Research Topic 
Academic peace research and 
security studies have at least since the 
end of the Cold War focused on topics 
that relate to regional instability, or 
the management and prevention of 
violent conflict in fragile Third World 
or transition countries. Questions like 
the importance of ethnic or religious 
fragmentation, the role of economic 
factors (“greed or grievance”) and the 
functions of states and governance 
mechanisms in conflict dynamics 
have received special attention. It has 
become quite obvious that inter-state 
wars have decreased in number and 
probably importance, while intra-state 
violence, civil wars or non-state actors 
have been on the rise. While inter-
state war has not and will not com-
pletely disappear, as the US and Brit-
ish war against Iraq has demon-
strated, situations of civil war, insur-
gencies, state breakdown and geno-
cide have claimed the greatest num-
ber of victims. Fragmentation of states 
and societies and its potential for vio-
lence have been important areas of 
interest. 
The discussion on how to re-
spond to these situations of internal 
instability and violent conflict has 
taken several tracks. The spectrum of 
approaches ranges from “conflict pre-
vention” on the one hand to “humani-
tarian interventionism” on the other, 
from attempts to deal with conflicts 
before they turn violent to using mili-
tary means to end, manage or at least 
reduce human suffering from them. 
The different courses of discus-
sion have produced valuable insights 
with regard to pre-conflict, violence 
and war, and post-conflict situations. 
Often the results have indicated the 
importance of states as crucial factors 
in internal violence, either because of 
their uncontrolled strength, their in-
strumentalizing of or being instru-
mentalized by competing groups in 
societies, or because of their weakness 
or fragmentation. Therefore terms like 
“weak states”, “failed” (or “failing”) 
states and “quasi-states” have gained 
prominence, and the issues of “state-
building” and “nation-building” have 
been seriously discussed as proper 
responses to crises or as means of 
crisis prevention (Hippler 2005b). 
Taken together, the questions 
of how to avoid and how to manage 
violent conflict have very often been 
connected not primarily to an analysis 
of inter-state relations, but to dynam-
ics inside states and societies. As a 
result the responses to political vio-
lence have also mostly focused on 
these aspects. The issue of how to deal 
with the internal political, social, eco-
nomic or security affairs of a country 
threatened by or already disrupted by 
internal violence has ranked high on 
the academic and political agenda.  
To some it might sound sur-
prising, but very similar questions 
have been dealt with extensively in 
the military services of some coun-
tries. Sometimes the context may dif-
fer, being either “Small Wars”, nation-
building, low-intensity warfare, Op-
erations Other than War, or counter-
insurgency. But many military ana-
lysts have become quite aware of the 
problem of intra-state violence. For 
instance, Steven Metz and Raymond 
Millen of the US Army War College, 
Strategic Studies Institute, put the 
problem this way: 
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“Today the world has entered another period 
when sustained, large-scale conventional war 
between states is unlikely, at least in the near 
term. But mounting global discontent arising 
from globalization; the failure of economic 
development to keep pace with expectations; 
the collapse of traditional political, economic, 
and social orders; widespread anger and re-
sentment; environmental decay; population 
pressure; the presence of weak regimes; the 
growth of transnational organized crime; and 
the widespread availability of arms are mak-
ing insurgency common and strategically 
significant. This significance is likely to con-
tinue for at least a decade, perhaps longer” 
(Metz and Millen 2004: 1). 
6 
Other authors have connected 
the problems in question with the end 
of the Cold War,1 which has changed 
international relations in general and 
the internal conditions in many Third 
World nations. Lt.Col. Charles 
Hasskamp of the US Air Force put it 
this way: 
“The “containment” effect of the cold war 
largely prevented the window panes of the 
global structure from breaking and shower-
ing glass onto states other than the super-
powers. Unfortunately, the two sides often 
ignored the task of helping to build long-
term, self-sustaining economic and political 
capabilities for the newer nations. Providing 
military and economic aid to weak and cor-
rupt regimes did little to promote democratic 
politics, market economies, or the institutions 
to support them. When the “shutters” came 
off, a number of the newer countries were revealed 
to be failed nation-states or close to that status. 
One result is that global security problems have 
accelerated and are increasingly concentrated in 
the old third world countries; they can generally 
be categorized as being political, economic, ethnic, 
or religious in nature. This is evidenced, for 
example, by recent conflicts and turmoil in 
Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia, and Haiti. 
These conflicts generate emotional appeals 
for humanitarian or peace operations regard-
less of relevance to fundamental US interests” 
(Hasskamp 1998). 
Similar questions have been 
dealt with by the military forces of 
quite a few countries, mostly in the 
                                                     
                                                     
1  Compare also: Snow 1993, where regional 
conflict after the end of the Cold War and coun-
terinsurgency are analyzed. 
United States. But these military dis-
cussions have rarely been recognized 
by the academic community, and 
peace research specialists have all but 
ignored them, especially in Europe.2 
To some degree this is understand-
able, because the starting points and 
political contexts of both communities 
have been quite different from each 
other: while peace research is either a 
subject of academic analysis or starts 
from the assumption of the impera-
tive to prevent political violence or 
reduce its volume, armed forces are 
not organizations for promoting dis-
covery and the growth of knowledge, 
but tools for achieving what is per-
ceived as the “national interest”. Mili-
tary forces are not primarily in the 
business of analyzing the world, but 
of providing means of coercion to 
control it. This implies different “cul-
tures” within the academic and mili-
tary communities: while one tries to 
analyze and understand conflict and 
war (and deals with them mostly 
from a distance, and by using words, 
writing books and articles) the other 
is an important actor within them. 
Ultimately the function of the military 
is to fight and win wars, which is far 
from being an academic exercise.3  
Still, it would not be advisable 
to ignore the discussions, strategies 
and policies inside the US military 
with regard to regional conflicts, for 
two obvious reasons. Firstly, although 
the strategizing of the US military 
2  Note the difference compared with the 
1980s, when many academics and peace re-
searchers were experts in nuclear strategy and 
ballistic missile systems and quite closely fol-
lowed the US military discussions in these 
fields. 
3  The US Army would clearly agree with 
this. Its Field Manual FM 100-5, Operations, 
used the following formulation 1993: “The 
Army’s primary focus is to fight and win the 
nation’s wars”. 
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may have different starting points 
and different goals than academic 
discourse, it still can offer valuable 
insights into the character of conflict 
dynamics and possible ways to deal 
with them. This does not imply any 
requirement for the academic re-
searcher to adopt a military perspec-
tive, but rather to find out whether 
there is anything that could be 
learned from it. Since armed forces 
are supposed to deal with violence 
and to fight and win wars, they often 
have tried to analyze and understand 
them first. In the words of a US Army 
Manual: “Insurgents must be under-
stood before they can be defeated.” 
(US Department of the Army 1992: no 
page given) It is worth looking at 
these attempts to understand. Sec-
ondly, the US armed forces are a ma-
jor player in the field. In many re-
gional conflicts the US forces do play 
an important or at least a contributing 
role, e.g. by advising, training or sup-
porting local forces, by providing 
arms and ammunition, by developing 
strategies to deal with specific situa-
tions of conflict or violence, or by di-
rectly intervening. It is therefore im-
portant to know and understand the 
conceptual context the US armed 
forces are operating in, and their basic 
assumptions.  
In the current situation, with 
US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan 
actively fighting rather ruthless coun-
terinsurgency campaigns, the topic is 
of pressing relevance. The future of 
both countries, of the entire Middle 
East, and of the US role as a unilater-
ally acting global enforcer of imposed 
discipline will be decided to a great 
degree by the success or failure of 
these counterinsurgency campaigns. 
And Burnett/Whyte in a recent article 
have drawn a connection between the 
fashionable concepts of a “New Ter-
rorism”, Western counterterrorism 
(including in Iraq) and traditional 
counterinsurgency: 
“In political terms, the claim is that the new 
terrorism represents a break from the past. 
[…] [I]t is highly illuminating […] that we 
see, in the example of Iraq, a simultaneous 
call for a return to the old counterinsurgency 
strategy. Despite all of the hyperbole sur-
rounding the new ‘netwar’ and the new ter-
rorism, it is being argued that this enemy 
should be dealt with in precisely the same 
manner as 20th century colonial rebellions” 
(Burnett and Whitey 2005: 14). 7
It is indeed interesting that a 
political/military strategy with such 
deep historical roots as counterinsur-
gency has been reinvented so many 
times and is of considerable signifi-
cance in so many different political 
contexts and in such recent develop-
ments. 
This paper will try to describe 
the historical development of con-
cepts and US military doctrines in 
regard to controlling regional con-
flicts, and will attempt to systematize 
and analyze them. The goal is there-
fore a modest one, namely primarily 
to introduce the US military ap-
proaches to academic discourse. At 
some points it will also be necessary 
to ask whether some elements of their 
thinking can contribute to under-
standing violent conflict and political 
approaches to deal with them. And it 
will be of interest whether US military 
strategies may pose an additional 
problem for conflict resolution, and 
how these strategies may influence 
civilian actors in the field. The focus 
on the US armed forces results both 
from the fact that these are politically 
and militarily much more important 
than others, that their strategies on 
regional control and intervention are 
highly developed, and that these also 
are more accessible than those of 
other countries. This does not imply 
any ignoring of the fact that other 
countries have also been deeply in-
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volved in similar operations (such as 
Britain, France, Israel, the Soviet Un-
ion and Russia), and that others have 
developed their specific approaches to 
counterinsurgency, like a “British 
school” of thought.4 Third World 
countries in some cases also have de-
veloped comparable traditions, India 
being one example (Varma 1988). 
8 
While this paper will try to ana-
lyze some of the intended and unin-
tended impacts, problems and spill-
over effects of US strategies, it still is 
of an introductory character. To ac-
quaint the reader with US military 
thinking, it will extensively quote 
from military sources, especially 
when dealing with counterinsur-
gency. Wherever possible, internet 
addresses will be provided for docu-
ments and other sources to allow easy 
access for the interested reader. 
At the outset a few remarks on 
terminology are in order. As in the 
academic context, the military debate 
also suffers from a lack of clarity in 
regard to terminology. The questions 
                                                     
4  Generally, for example, the British coun-
terinsurgency operations have placed less em-
phasis on military combat and more on police 
and intelligence work and political and socio-
economic development. See, for instance: 
Newsinger 2002, for a US view on British coun-
terinsurgency: Cassidy 2005: 53-59. Two classi-
cal publications representing the British school 
of counterinsurgency are: Thompson 1966 
(1974); and Kitson, 1971 (1991). 
we are dealing with are quite com-
plex, and the language we use is not 
always clear and precise, but can fur-
ther confuse the topics involved. And 
while it will be necessary to deal with 
the terminology later in more detail, a 
few clarifying remarks are necessary 
here. 
The US armed forces have not 
consistently used the same terms to 
characterize the same or very similar 
phenomena. Over time terminology 
has changed and will further change 
in the future, and sometimes different 
terminology has been a result of al-
ternative viewpoints. Four terms have 
been used most often to describe mili-
tary policies and approaches to re-
gional conflicts: 
“Doctrine is the concise expression of how 
Army forces contribute to unified action in 
campaigns, major operations, battles, and 
engagements. … Doctrine touches all as-
pects of the Army. It facilitates communica-
tion among soldiers no matter where they 
serve, contributes to a shared professional 
culture, and serves as the basis for curric-
ula in the Army Education System. Army 
doctrine provides a common language and 
a common understanding of how Army 
forces conduct operations.” (US Depart-
ment of the Army 2001: 1-14) • Small wars, respectively small 
war doctrines or strategies; 
• Low-Intensity Warfare, or Low In-
tensity Conflict (LIC), and corre-
sponding doctrines; and 
• Military Operations Other than 
War (MOOTW, pronounced 
“moot-wah”; sometimes also re-
ferred to as OOTW, “Operations 
Other than War”). 
• Stability Operations and Support 
Operations and their doctrines. 
While there are and have been 
minor differences between these 
terms, generally their meaning has 
been very close to each other, and 
often they have been used inter-
changeably. “Small Wars” has been 
used from early on, at least since the 
first half of the 20th century, until to-
day, while LIC was fashionable 
mostly in the 1980s, MOOTW has 
been since the 1990s, and “Stability 
Operations” has been thereafter. De-
spite the changes of terminology, 
most officers dealing with these ques-
tions are aware of the continuity be-
hind them. 
 
Counterinsurgency and Political Control 
Richard McMonagle, for in-
stance, explained in 1996: 
“With the new concept of Military Operations 
Other Than War, new doctrine is needed. Al-
though the title is new, many of the activities 
of Military Operations Other Than War pre-
viously fit within the areas of small wars or 
low-intensity conflict. As the military devel-
ops this doctrine, it should not only look to 
recent experiences, but also to those of the 
past.” (Richard 1996: 4) 
9All these terms have been and 
still are somewhat vague, and have 
included whole sub-sets of policies 
and concepts. Again, while we will be 
more differentiating and more precise 
on this later, here a rough orientation 
on the categories of the key terms 
may be sufficient. Generally, the main 
sub-categories of Small Wars, LIC, 
MOOTW and Stability Operations 
are: 
• Counterinsurgency operations, 
that is strategies, tactics and poli-
cies to weaken or defeat local in-
surgent forces; 
• Pro-insurgency operations, aim-
ing at support of local insurgen-
cies; 
• Limited military operations be-
low the threshold of conven-
tional war, e.g. “surgical” air 
strikes, evacuation operations, 
peace-keeping, brief or limited 
military interventions or occupa-
tions to achieve a specific aim, 
counterterrorism operations, and 
others. 
It is obvious that the last cate-
gory in particular is less than pre-
cisely defined. And while this paper 
will not ignore it and pro-insurgency 
operations, its focus will be on the 
first category, on counterinsurgency. 
Historically and politically, this has 
probably been the most important of 
the three categories, and it also pro-
vides us with lessons that will be use-
ful to understand the other elements 
or Small Wars/LIC/MOOTW.  
It is also quite obvious that 
categories like insurgency and coun-
terinsurgency intrinsically do not fo-
cus on the level of inter-state rela-
tions, but on influencing the internal 
security (and political) situations in 
foreign countries. Helping insurgent 
forces to succeed or repressing them 
are goals that aim at re-shaping the 
security situation completely, and at 
re-distributing the internal balance of 
power in a target country. And, as we 
will see, very often these aims and 
strategies are closely linked to ques-
tions of internal governance, and even 
to the problems of state- or nation-
building.  
Finally, it should also be men-
tioned that this paper is primarily 
based on literature that has been pro-
duced by specialists from within the 
US armed forces or former military 
officers, including official documents 
from the US army or other services, 
like the “Field Manuals” that provide 
guidance for respective operations 
and are used for training purposes. 
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2. From “Small Wars” to Post-Vietnam – 
Historical Background to 
Counterinsurgency 
2.1 The Starting Point: The 
Small Wars Manual of 1940 
The US military has a long his-
tory of military intervention in Third 
World countries, especially in the 
direct neighborhood of the United 
States. While these interventions were 
mostly imperial in character and 
aimed at political and economic con-
trol, they often included elements of 
counterinsurgency and re-shaping the 
internal politics of a target country.5  
10 
The numerous “banana wars” 
of the first third of the 20th century, 
such as those in Nicaragua, Haiti, the 
Dominican Republic and several other 
countries in Central America and the 
Caribbean, did not start this kind of 
military interventions, because there 
have been more than a few predeces-
sor operations in the second half of 
the previous century.6 But while there 
had been some interesting conceptual 
discussion going on,7 these experi-
ences were systematized and concep-
tually integrated into military doc-
trine for probably the first time in the 
late 1930s. In 1940 the US Marine 
Corps, which had been the most im-
portant instrument of military inter-
vention before,8 produced a “Small 
                                                     
                                                              5  For early examples of counterinsurgency 
from a US experience and also by other coun-
tries see e.g.: Beckett 1988. 
6  For a useful overview in regard to US 
military interventions up to the 1930 see: 
McMonagle 1996: 7-44 and Grimmett, 2002: 3. 
7  An early example of discussing strategy 
in regard to Small Wars and US occupation of 
Third World countries is: Ellis 1921: 1-15. 
8  Marine Corps Colonel McMonagle sum-
marized its role in 1996 like this: “The colonial 
Wars Manual” of nearly 500 pages 
(US Marine Corps 1940). Right at the 
beginning this manual defined the 
term “small war”: 
“The term “Small War” is often a vague name 
for any one of a great variety of military op-
erations. As applied to the United States, 
small wars are operations undertaken under 
executive authority, wherein military force is 
combined with diplomatic pressure in the in-
ternal or external affairs of another state 
whose government is unstable, inadequate, or 
unsatisfactory [Italics: J.H.] for the preserva-
tion of life and of such interests as are deter-
mined by the foreign policy of our Nation” 
(ibid 1-1: 1). 
While this definition still is less 
than satisfactory and its terminology 
confusing (since it uses the term “dip-
lomatic pressure” for all kinds of non-
military tools), it already clarifies the 
fact that the small wars doctrine ap-
plies to “unstable, inadequate, or un-
satisfactory” foreign governments 
and aims at linking military and civil-
ian tools.  
Additionally the manual clari-
fies the point that “most of the small 
wars of the United States … have 
been undertaken to suppress lawless-
ness and insurrection” (ibid 1-2: 2). It 
expands on the aims of small wars by 
stating: “Intervention in the internal 
affairs of a state may be undertaken to 
restore order, to sustain governmental 
 
aspirations of the United States, in the form of 
manifest destiny, although much different from 
those of the Europeans, still required the em-
ployment of the military instrument of power 
to maintain its empire and protect its interests. 
The United States Marine Corps, in its tradi-
tional mission of service with the fleet, became 
the landing force of an interventionist Navy 
and evolved into colonial infantry.” (McMona-
gle 1996: 7).
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authority, [Italics: J.H.] to obtain re-
dress, or to enforce the fulfillment of 
obligations binding between the two 
states” (ibid 1-7: 12). The Marine 
Corps Manual also tries to clarify the 
moral dimension of small wars, 
though in occasionally somewhat 
surprising terms: “Interventions or 
occupations are usually peaceful and 
altruistic” (ibid 1-8: 13). This assump-
tion is in obvious contradiction to 
most of the rest of the manual, since it 
would not be necessary if small wars 
were usually “peaceful”. It is also less 
than clear whether some of the coun-
tries occupied and pacified by the US 
in the Small Wars up to the 1930s 
would have agreed on the “altruistic” 
character of these wars. 
11
The most important and most 
frequent kinds of small wars are 
summarized in categories of insur-
gency and guerilla warfare. From the 
perspective of the authors of the small 
wars manual – and the Marine Corps, 
since the manual constituted its offi-
cial doctrine – the main component of 
a small war is fighting insurgency. 
“In small wars it can be expected that hostile 
forces in occupied territory will employ guer-
illa warfare as a means of gaining their end. 
[...] Consequently, in campaigns of this nature 
the Force will be exposed to the action of this 
young and vigorous element. Rear installa-
tions and lines of communications will be 
threatened. Movements will be retarded by 
ambuscades and barred defiles, and every 
detachment presenting a tempting target will 
be harassed or attacked. In warfare of this 
kind, members of native forces will suddenly 
become innocent peasant workers when it 
suits their fancy and convenience. In addi-
tion, the Force will be handicapped by parti-
sans, who constantly and accurately inform 
native forces of our movements. The popula-
tion will be honeycombed with hostile sym-
pathizers, making it difficult to procure reli-
able information. Such difficulty will result 
either from the deceit used by hostile sympa-
thizers and agents, or from the intimidation 
of friendly natives upon whom reliance might 
be placed to gain information” (ibid 1-9:14). 
These words adequately de-
scribe some basic elements of insur-
gency and guerrilla war, and today 
remind the reader of later discussions 
on “people’s war” from a Maoist or 
Latin American perspective.9 They 
also summarize many later cases of 
small wars/LIC/MOOTW from a US 
perspective, up to the wars in Af-
ghanistan and Iraq. In this sense, the 
Small Wars Manual of 1940 still is 
highly relevant, as has been empha-
sized time and again since its re-
publication in 1986. But the most in-
novative element in it has been in 
making the connection between mili-
tary elements in Small Wars and their 
its political, economic and psycho-
logical factors. This becomes most 
explicit when the causes of violence in 
Small Wars are being discussed: 
“The difficulty is sometimes of an economi-
cal, political, or social nature and not a mili-
tary problem in origin. In one recent cam-
paign the situation was an internal political 
problem in origin, but it had developed to 
such a degree that foreign national interests 
were affected; simple orderly processes 
could no longer be applied when it had out-
grown the local means of control. In an-
other instance the problem was economic 
and social; great tracts of the richest land 
were controlled and owned by foreign in-
terests; this upset the natural order of 
things; the admission of cheap foreign labor 
with lower standards of living created a so-
cial condition among the people which 
should have been remedied by orderly 
means before it reached a crisis” (Marine 
Corps 1940: 15). 
The manual argues that, be-
cause the causes of conflict are not 
primarily military but social, eco-
nomic and political, any Small Wars 
campaign cannot and should not be 
designed in military terms alone.  
“The application of purely military measures 
may not, by itself restore peace and orderly 
                                                     
9  For a short historical background on 
guerrilla wars see, for instance, Ibrahim 2004: 
112-124. 
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government because the fundamental causes 
of the condition of unrest may be economic, 
political, or social. These conditions may have 
originated years ago and in many cases have 
been permitted to develop freely without any 
attempt to apply corrective measures. An 
acute situation finally develops when condi-
tions have reached a stage that is beyond con-
trol of the civil authorities and it is too late for 
diplomatic adjustment. The solution of such 
problems being basically a political adjust-
ment, the military measures to be applied 
must be of secondary importance and should 
be applied only to such extent as to permit 
the continuation of peaceful corrective meas-
ures. 
12 
The initial problem is to restore peace. There 
may be many economic and social factors in-
volved, pertaining to the administrative, ex-
ecutive, and judicial functions of the govern-
ment. These are completely beyond military 
power as such unless some form of military 
government is included in the campaign plan. 
Peace and industry cannot be restored per-
manently without appropriate provisions for 
the economic welfare of the people. More-
over, productive industry cannot be fully re-
stored until there is peace. Consequently, the 
remedy is found in emphasizing the correc-
tive measures to be taken in order to permit 
the orderly return to normal conditions” 
(ibid: 1-9, 15 et sqq.). 
It is quite remarkable that the 
1940 Small Wars manual of the US 
Marine Corps so strongly expresses 
the problems of governance and of 
“the economic welfare of the people” 
to resolve local conflicts. And the ar-
gument that these points “are com-
pletely beyond military power” will 
have to be kept in mind for later dis-
cussion. Other important points made 
by the Small Wars Manual have re-
cently been summarized by Cassidy 
in Parameters, the Journal of the US 
Army War College: 
“While delay in the use of force may be inter-
preted as weakness, the Small Wars Manual 
maintains, the brutal use of force is not ap-
propriate either. “In small wars, tolerance, 
sympathy, and kindness should be the key-
note to our relationship with the mass of the 
population.” For small wars, the manual 
urges US forces to employ as many indige-
nous troops as is practical early on to confer 
proper responsibility on indigenous agencies 
for restoring law and order. Moreover, it 
stresses the importance of focusing on the so-
cial, economic, and political development of 
the people more than on simple material de-
struction” (Cassidy 2004: 80)  
The relevance of the Small 
Wars Manual of the US Marine Corps 
of 1940 mostly results from its ap-
proach to regional conflict as caused 
by socio-economic and political fac-
tors and its formulation of a strategy 
taking this into account (For a useful 
analysis of the Small Wars Manual see 
chapter 4 of: McMonagle 1996: 7-44). 
While it grew out of decades of impe-
rial military interventions and by it-
self does not transcend this context, 
the manual betrays a good under-
standing of the character of regional 
conflict and its causes. It also stresses 
the importance of political factors, 
such as the (in-)capacity of the local 
state in conflict dynamics. The man-
ual even contains a chapter about the 
organization of local elections by oc-
cupation authorities, to create a new, 
legitimate system of governance. In 
this sense the manual planned for key 
steps in regard to state- and nation-
building under the conditions of mili-
tary occupation. While the manual is 
outdated in many regards today – e.g. 
concerning the technological aspects 
of military operations – some of its 
basic strategic foundations are still 
relevant today (Ford 2003: 89). 
2.2 World War II up to the 
Reagan Presidency 
The Small Wars Manual had 
been published precisely at a time 
when the US perspective on its for-
eign and security policy was having 
to change dramatically.10 While be-
fore, the US military (with the major 
exception of World War I) had been 
                                                     
10  For historical background also see: Metz 
1995. 
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mostly operating in the US “back-
yard” – Central America and the Car-
ibbean, plus in the Pacific and parts of 
Asia – and faced only challenges of a 
limited degree, the Second World War 
and the Cold War changed the strate-
gic and security context completely. 
After 1940 the main focus of US for-
eign and military policy became to 
win the global war against Japan and 
Germany, and then to compete with 
the Soviet Union, again on a global 
scale. Small Wars appeared to be of 
much lesser importance, while the 
danger of nuclear war and the policies 
of “roll back” or “containment” of the 
Soviet Union demanded attention. 
The war in Korea (with the People’s 
Republic of China as the main an-
tagonist) reinforced the perception 
that Small Wars were now of little 
importance. To be sure, these kinds of 
conflicts never completely disap-
peared, as the insurgency in the Phil-
ippines (late 1940s to early 1950s) or 
the major CIA operations in Guate-
mala (1954) and against Cuba (1961) 
demonstrated.11 But still, the attention 
of the US armed forces after 1945 was 
mostly directed towards Central 
Europe and the Soviet Union, and 
military strategies emphasized heavy 
armor, major war, and a reliance on a 
maximum of firepower, both conven-
tional and nuclear.  
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“For most of the 20th century, the US military 
culture (notwithstanding the Marines’ work 
in small wars) generally embraced the big 
conventional war paradigm and fundamen-
tally eschewed small wars and insurgencies. 
Thus, instead of learning from our experi-
ences in Vietnam, the Philippines, the Marine 
Corps’ experience in the Banana Wars, and 
the Indian campaigns, the US Army for most 
of the last 100 years has viewed these experi-
ences as ephemeral anomalies and aberra-
tions – distractions from preparing to win big 
wars against other big powers. As a result of 
                                                     
11  For selected Small Wars of the 1960s and 
1970s see, for instance: Beckett/Pimlott 1985. 
marginalizing the counterinsurgencies and 
small wars that it has spent most of its exis-
tence prosecuting, the US military’s big-war 
cultural preferences have impeded it from 
fully benefiting – studying, distilling, and in-
corporating into doctrine – from our some-
what extensive lessons in small wars and in-
surgencies” (Cassidy 2004: 75). 
Small Wars and counterinsur-
gency did and do require specific ap-
proaches compared to conventional 
warfare, and therefore require differ-
ent kind of training, armament, and 
tactics. From the beginning it was 
doubtful whether regular soldiers 
would be capable of dealing with 
these kinds of operations, or whether 
specialized military units would be 
preferable. In the first half of the 
twentieth century (and to some de-
gree even after that) the Marine Corps 
had been the military service mostly 
involved in Small Wars, and it was 
not by chance that the Small Wars 
manual had been produced by it, and 
not by the US Army or Navy. But 
even the Marines did not consider 
Small Wars their primary responsibil-
ity, but were struggling what its core 
business should be: either concentrat-
ing on amphibious operations, 
thereby forming a link between the 
conventional operations of the navy 
and the army, or focusing on small 
wars. Since World War II and the 
coming of the Cold War, the prefer-
ence was on amphibious operations, 
since this was very much required in 
the Pacific War against Japan, and it 
also brought more prestige and fund-
ing. Small Wars basically were a side-
show, which must not be allowed to 
draw too much attention away from 
the important strategic competition 
resulting from the East-West conflict 
(Ford 2003: 2-42). 
To some degree this changed in 
the 1960s, when the Kennedy admini-
stration re-introduced counterinsur-
gency as an important part of US mili-
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tary operations.12 Under the Kennedy 
administration the organizational set-
up was changed. Since counterinsur-
gency was being taken much more 
seriously, the need for specialized 
forces was appreciated. As a result, 
the Special Operations Forces of the 
military services were expanded con-
siderably, and given a major role in 
Small Wars and counterinsurgency. 
President Kennedy put the new job in 
these terms: 
14 
“This is another type of war, new in its inten-
sity, ancient in its origins – war by guerrillas, 
subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by 
ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, 
instead of aggression, seeking victory by 
eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of 
engaging him. It is a form of warfare 
uniquely adapted [...] to undermine the ef-
forts of new and poor countries to maintain 
the freedom that they have finally achieved. 
It preys on economic unrest and ethnic con-
flicts. It requires in those situations where we 
must counter it, and these are the kinds of 
challenges that will be before us in the next 
decade if freedom is to be saved, a whole new 
kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of 
force, and therefore a new and wholly differ-
ent kind of military training” (Donnelly 2003: 
4). 
Many high-ranking officers did 
not agree. The Army Chief of Staff, 
Gen. George Decker, remarked in 
direct opposition to the new emphasis 
on counterinsurgency that “any good 
soldier can handle guerrillas” and got 
fired later by the President for his lack 
of enthusiasm (Duncan 1998: 48). 
At the beginning, the rediscov-
ery of fighting Small Wars (even 
though this term was not often used) 
was mostly directed at Latin America, 
especially after the fiasco of the Bay of 
Pigs invasion against Cuba in 1961. 
Latin American liberation move-
ments, often inspired by the Cuban 
revolution, became the main target for 
                                                     
12  A good overview of the discussion during 
the early 1960s can be found in: Greene 1965 
and Rosenau 2003: 65-99. 
the US government, and were fought 
with a mixture of liberal reform (in 
the context of the Alliance for Pro-
gress) and repression, which took the 
form of counterinsurgency. Soon af-
terwards Vietnam became another 
case of major US counterinsurgency 
operations, there in a subservient role 
to conventional warfare including up 
to more than half a million US sol-
diers. The US counterinsurgency op-
erations in Vietnam to some degree 
were quite effective, technically 
speaking, by weakening the oppo-
nents. But they also suffered from two 
major faults: firstly, counterinsur-
gency and the conventional war 
tended to get into each other's way, 
and did not complement each other. 
Especially under the command of 
General Westmoreland counterinsur-
gency was not taken seriously, and 
the war was fought along quite con-
ventional lines by the US (Sorley 1999: 
1-16). Secondly, counterinsurgency, 
especially in the context of “Operation 
Phoenix”, included practices such as 
political murder, assassinations, tor-
ture and other forms of illegal and 
brutal activities, which helped with 
intimidating the rural population, but 
did not exactly win the “hearts and 
minds” of the Vietnamese. This cam-
paign of murder discredited US coun-
terinsurgency in Vietnam, both with 
the Vietnamese and with large sectors 
of the US public (Valentine 1990). 
When in addition to this the war was 
lost (politically, not militarily) the 
Vietnam War became a symbol of 
arrogance and failure, and along with 
it US counterinsurgency became 
completely discredited. This did not 
just apply to the US public, but also to 
the military: after Vietnam, the US 
armed forces concentrated more than 
ever before on preparing for major 
wars, either conventional or nuclear.  
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“The US military has had a host of successful 
experiences in counterguerrilla war, includ-
ing some distinct successes with certain as-
pects of the Vietnam War. However, the 
paradox stemming from America’s unsuc-
cessful crusade in the jungles of Vietnam is 
this – because the experience was perceived 
as anathema to the mainstream American 
military, hard lessons learned there about 
fighting guerrillas were neither embedded 
nor preserved in the US Army’s institutional 
memory. The American military culture’s ef-
forts to expunge the specter of Vietnam, em-
bodied in the mantra “No More Vietnams,” 
also prevented the US Army as an institution 
from really learning from those lessons. In 
fact, even the term “counterinsurgency” 
seemed to become a reviled and unwelcome 
word, one that the doctrinal cognoscenti of 
the 1980s conveniently transmogrified into 
“foreign internal defense” (Cassidy 2004: 73 
et sqq.). 
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Therefore Small Wars and 
counterinsurgency became even less 
prominent in military thinking and 
military strategy, and a smart soldier 
trying to get promoted fast preferred 
to choose conventional warfare as his 
field of expertise. Conrad Crane re-
marked: 
“Army involvement in counterinsurgency 
was first seen as an aberration and then as a 
mistake to be avoided. Instead of focusing on 
the proper synchronization of military and 
political tools with objectives necessary for 
success in low intensity unconventional con-
flicts, the Army continued to concentrate on 
mid to high intensity conventional wars” 
(Crane 2002: 2). 
The Vietnam War had calmed 
down any appetite of US policy mak-
ers at foreign intervention for a while. 
The “Vietnam Syndrome” dominating 
foreign policy thinking, making it a 
big priority not to get into a similar 
situation abroad again. The results 
included: 
• The proclamation of the so-called 
“Nixon Doctrine”, which wanted 
to avoid direct US military inter-
vention by relying on local sur-
rogates, like Saudi Arabia and 
the Iran of Shah Mohammed 
Reza Pahlevi in the Persian Gulf; 
• An even stronger concentration 
on the European theater of op-
erations, with its focus on tank 
battles, fire power, technology, 
maneuver warfare and conven-
tional and nuclear preparedness; 
and 
• A certain distaste for low-level 
Third World interventions, 
which were perceived as poten-
tial traps to draw the US into 
situations of “another Vietnam”. 
As mentioned before, Small 
Wars/LIC/MOOTW strategies 
became de-emphasized in this 
process. 
This shift of military strategy 
lasted until the late 1970s and early 
1980s, and finally came to an end with 
the election of the Reagan Admini-
stration. The early Reagan years (be-
ginning in January 1981) marked the 
re-ascendancy of Small Wars strate-
gies. While the term was generally 
avoided and re-christened “Low-
Intensity Conflict” (LIC) / “Low Iten-
sity Warfare”, the substance of it was 
brought back, against the strong resis-
tance of many high-ranking officers.  
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3. Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC) 
Low-intensity warfare theorists 
had studied and drawn conclusions 
from the US defeat in Vietnam. Viet-
nam had three consequences which 
military planners in Washington 
wanted to avoid in the future:  
16 • The war had been costly in every respect. At its peak, there were 
over half a million US troops in 
Vietnam. More than 54,000 US 
military personnel (besides 3.6 
million of Vietnamese) were 
killed and the dollar cost of the 
war exceeded $150 billion 1967 
dollars. 
• The war was lost. Despite its 
substantial commitment, the 
United States, a superpower, did 
not manage to defeat the impov-
erished developing country of 
Vietnam. Clearly, US strategy 
and tactics were inappropriate, 
promoting military theorists to 
ask why this was so and what 
changes had to be made to pre-
pare for future confrontations of 
this type. 
• In the last years and then the af-
termath of the war, US society 
was so politically polarized that 
the government's scope for mili-
tary action abroad became 
greatly restricted. 
After the Vietnam era, large-
scale interventions by US armed 
forces were seen by the majority of US 
policy makers as politically divisive, 
as well as economically expensive. 
They sought effective alternative 
means of maintaining US dominance 
in the Third World. The low-intensity 
warfare doctrine was created in order 
to permit an active Third World pol-
icy, including military components,  
without generating the high-visibility 
exposure of "another Vietnam". Con-
sequently, LIC campaigns were de-
signed so that the extent of US in-
volvement was kept within pro-
scribed limits by optimizing the qual-
ity of that involvement rather than its 
quantity. Compared with direct mili-
tary intervention, LIC was cheap and 
required little manpower (since local 
troops in counterinsurgency, or lo-
cally-recruited contras of foreign mer-
cenaries in pro-insurgency, provide 
the main force levels). 
Furthermore -- and this was a 
decisive criterion – LIC was perceived 
as more effective than conventional 
forms of intervention. As US Army 
Field Manual FM 100-20 formulated 
in December 1990: “US policy recog-
nizes that indirect, rather than direct, 
applications of US military power are 
the most appropriate and cost-
effective ways to achieve national 
goals in a LIC environment” (US De-
partment of Army and the Air Force, 
FM 100-20 1990: 1-2). 
It was better attuned to the 
causes of Third World conflicts; it 
employed, so to speak, "appropriate 
technology" for military tasks; and it 
largely avoided the counterproduc-
tive effects of direct US intervention, 
such as the rise of nationalist solidar-
ity among the population against for-
eign invaders. Thus, in general, it was 
supposed to avoid the hazards result-
ing from military overreaction and 
excessive militarization of a conflict 
by the United States. With the aid of 
specific techniques and through in-
creased efficiency, LIC was designed 
to render direct US intervention un-
necessary. 
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The literature attempts to dis-
tinguish among various categories of 
LIC. The main ones are: 
1. Counterinsurgency; 
2. Pro-insurgency, (Contra opera-
tions), i.e. the organization of 
subversion and insurgency; 
3. Counterterrorism, itself a collec-
tive term for diverse concepts 
and instruments, all of which are 
aimed at the offensive, military 
combating of "terrorism"; 
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4. Narrowly limited, "surgical" mili-
tary operations using conven-
tional forces. This category may 
be applied within any of the 
three tactical approaches above 
or independent of them; 
5. Other operations, e.g. rescue ac-
tions, participation in interna-
tional peace-keeping forces and 
the like. 
Sometimes, as in the US Army 
Field Manual FM 100-20 in its 1990 
version (which at the same time is US 
Air Force Pamphlet AFP 3-20) other 
categorizations can be found. FM 100-
20 lists four of them, which overlap 
with those given above: 
• Support for insurgency and 
counterinsurgency 
• Combating terrorism 
• Peacekeeping operations 
• Peacetime contingency opera-
tions (ibid: 1-6). 
Again, it is obvious that the last 
category is a broad omnibus, includ-
ing many different possible opera-
tions. 
It needs to be pointed out here 
that not all LIC experts would have 
subscribed to this categorization. For 
example, Professor Sam Sarkesian, a 
political scientist, explicitly did not 
interpret limited conventional opera-
tions and terrorism as LIC. However, 
in taking this position, he definitely 
stands on his own. On the other hand, 
Sarkesian gave expression to a broad 
consensus when he stated: "Revolu-
tion and counterrevolution are the 
main categories" of LIC (Sarkesian 
1985:5).  
3.1 Low-Intensity Conflict: 
“Not Military Conquest, 
but Social Control” 
As the term was used by 
United States strategic thinkers of the 
1980s and early 1990s, low-intensity 
warfare combined various military 
and non-military concepts, virtually 
all of which were aimed at being em-
ployed in Third World situations.13 In 
the specialized military literature, the 
concepts were not always precisely 
defined. As a result, "low-intensity 
warfare" (LIW) and "low-intensity 
conflict" (LIC) were generally used as 
synonyms. Related terms like "foreign 
internal defense", "counterinsur-
gency", "counterterrorism", "special 
warfare", "special operations", "revo-
lutionary/counterrevolutionary war-
fare", "small wars", "limited wars" and 
others were not clearly distinguished. 
Sometimes they were employed as 
synonyms for LIC, sometimes as con-
ceptual antitheses, sometimes as sub-
categories. Almost every essay on LIC 
in a US military journal began with 
attempts of a definition, often with 
the result of furthering the termino-
logical confusion. 
Despite the differences, most 
US military analysts divided all con-
ceivable conflicts with military impli-
                                                     
13  For a critical and civilian view on LIC see: 
Klare/Kornbluh 1988; close to official view-
points are: Corr/Sloan 1992 and Thompson 
1989.  
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cations into three sections of a "con-
flict spectrum", ranging from the 
"lowest" level of violence and com-
mitment (i.e. the ones with least 
bloodshed and the least input) to a 
strategic nuclear war. Within this con-
tinuum of conceivable military con-
flicts, confrontations like World War 
II or a nuclear war were grouped in 
the category of "high-intensity con-
flicts". Confrontations on the scale of 
the Korean or Vietnam wars were 
regarded as "medium-intensity con-
flicts". All confrontations remaining 
by their nature below the level of 
high- or mid-level conventional war 
would be "low-intensity conflicts" 
(LICs). Given this approach (LICs are 
conflicts below the level of war), it 
becomes clear that LIC of necessity 
had to be an omnibus: Many different 
types of conflict meeting this criterion 
were conceivable. 
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LICs were conflicts which re-
quired from the US point of view rela-
tively little military input. From the 
perspective of the country affected, 
the impression may be completely 
different, and this may also give rise 
to misunderstandings. At a confer-
ence sponsored by the US Defense 
Department in January 1986, El Sal-
vador's Armed Forces Chief of Staff 
Gen. Adolfo Blandon stated that he 
could not accept the term "low-
intensity", noting that his country's 
civil war was of a high intensity (US 
Department of Defense 1986: 14). US 
Army Colonel John D. Waghelstein, 
former head of the US military advi-
sory group in El Salvador, rightly 
pointed out a year earlier that LIC 
was "total war at the social base" of a 
country (Waghelstein 1986: 1). The 
criterion of "low intensity" as part of 
the definition thus presupposed that 
one adopted the perspective of the 
country applying the force rather than 
the one on which it is applied. 
However, all agreed that while 
LIC is theoretically possible in a mod-
ern industrial nation, it was a form of 
conflict most appropriate to the Third 
World. Furthermore, it can be stated 
that this concept was to be applied 
only in cases where there was no di-
rect confrontation between the super-
powers, since such a confrontation, 
should armed conflict actually com-
mence, could scarcely be stabilized at 
a LIC level. Although allied, friendly 
or client regimes of either side or one 
of the superpowers themselves might 
be involved, LIC theory did not allow 
for direct conflict between the United 
States and the Soviet Union in the 
Third World. 
Finally, LIC was a concept not 
of a purely military nature, even 
though it has been developed and 
propounded chiefly by the US mili-
tary. Instead it was an integrated po-
litical, economic and military ap-
proach, supplemented by psychologi-
cal, social and diplomatic elements. 
Without much exaggeration it can be 
stated that conceptually LIC was pri-
marily a politically oriented and inte-
grated policy approach containing 
military elements – and not first and 
foremost a military matter: “LICs are 
politically dominated” (US Depart-
ment of the Army 1992: no page 
given). 
William Olsen of the US Army 
War College stated: "In actual fact, the 
definition of LIC should not concen-
trate on the military level of conflict, 
but on its political character. [...] The 
aim is not military conquest, but social 
control, for whose attainment military 
means can be employed as an element of 
the struggle [Italics: J.H.]. [...] The use 
of military force must be measured by 
its social and political utility. Military 
means are a tactical element of a stra-
tegic program that emphasizes goals 
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and means. Though important, the 
use of military might is limited, while 
the use of diplomatic and political 
means may be unlimited" (Olson 
1986: 218-220). 
The US Army's Field Circular 
FC 100-20, issued in May of 1986, de-
fined low-intensity warfare (conflict) 
as follows: "LIC is a limited politico-
military struggle to attain political, 
military, social, economic or psycho-
logical objectives. It is often of lengthy 
duration and extends from diplo-
matic, economic and psychological 
pressure to terrorism and insurgency. 
LIC is generally confined to a specific 
geographical area and is often charac-
terized by limitations of armaments, 
tactics and level of force. LIC involves 
the actual or contemplated use of 
military means up to just below the 
threshold of battle between regular 
armed forces" (US Army Command 
and General Staff College 1986: V). 
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This definition reveals two im-
portant elements: first the general 
character of LIC, with the civilian 
aspects also being stressed (e.g. eco-
nomic pressure). This is significant 
because some observers misinterpret 
LIC as exclusively or primarily a mili-
tary technique. Second, it makes clear 
the upper limits of use of military 
force beyond which the concept no 
longer applies. The definition also 
clarifies that LIC is a term embracing 
many types of conflict.  
US Air Force Colonel Cardwell 
commented that generally it is a case 
of "unconventional, socio-political, 
enduring and manpower-intensive 
warfare" and that, consequently, 
stamina and small-scale engagements 
not dependent on fire power or tech-
nology are of particular importance. 
"The aim is no longer to conquer and 
hold territory, but to maintain politi-
cal and economic access to the Third 
World by preemptively hindering the 
Soviets from achieving their expan-
sionary goals" (Cardwell III 1985: 13). 
Cardwell’s statement again 
emphasizes the unconventional mili-
tary character of Low-Intensity War-
fare. But it also takes us to the geo-
strategic context the LIC strategies 
were formulated in during the 1980s. 
3.2 Third World Instability and 
the “Soviet Threat”: US 
Rationale for Low-Intensity 
Conflict 
It is interesting to note the offi-
cial reasons given for the increased 
US commitment to LIC operations in 
the 1980s. On the one hand, it was 
argued that the military and strategic 
situation between the United States 
and the Soviet Union, especially in 
Central Europe, was stable. It was 
contended that the Soviet Union 
could hardly gain from a direct attack 
against the United States or its NATO 
allies and that it was therefore going 
on the offensive in the Third World, 
where there supposedly were numer-
ous conflicts to "exploit" to isolate the 
leading Western countries and hem 
them in. Secretary of State George 
Schultz described this as an “out-
flanking maneuver” (Schultz in ibid). 
This argument had two inter-
esting components: the first was the 
implicit (occasionally explicit) as-
sumption that, in the fields of nuclear 
and conventional arms, the Soviet 
Union was not superior to NATO, but 
at most on a par, and for this reason 
that it turned to the Third World in-
stead of attempting a confrontation in 
Central Europe. This was in direct 
contradiction to numerous official 
Western propaganda statements dur-
ing the Cold War, portraying the 
USSR as an “overwhelming” threat. 
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The strategic situation in Central 
Europe was considered stable in the 
medium and long term and, in the 
eyes of the United States, the main 
threat to Western interests came from 
and arose in the Third World.  
"The most likely threat to US interests may 
stem from local or regional conflicts and in-
ternal instability of allies or clients of the 
United States. Morocco, the Sudan, Egypt, 
Israel, Saudi Arabia, Mexico, Pakistan, the 
Philippines and the Republic of Korea – up to 
a certain degree all allies of America or the 
West – are all vulnerable to internal unrest 
and/or external attack. [...] Internal instability, 
possibly leading to a revolution, is a more 
probable scenario in many of these countries 
[than an external attack: J.H.]" (Tugwell and 
Charters 1984: 38). 
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At the same time US military 
planners observed that conflicts in 
Third World countries were linked to 
development failures. For instance, 
Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh 
stated: "Anyone who studies the re-
gions where insurgency occurs cannot 
fail to notice what the situations have 
in common: immature governments, 
emerging economies, population explo-
sions and social problems [Italics: J.H.], 
which have something to do with 
insufficient food supplies, poor health 
service and a high rate of illiteracy. 
This insurgency often takes place in 
areas with rich deposits of natural 
resources of considerable interest to 
the West. Many of these governments 
are susceptible to infiltration, subver-
sion and destabilization" (Marsh 1984: 
20). 
We remember that the Small 
Wars Manual of 1940 emphasized the 
negative role of “unstable, inade-
quate, or unsatisfactory” local gov-
ernment, while now the term of Secre-
tary Marsh was “immature govern-
ments” for the same argument. 
The economic and strategic im-
portance of certain Third World re-
gions for the capitalist countries and 
their simultaneous instability was 
thus, from this perspective, a central 
problem of Western foreign and secu-
rity policy. Given the concurrent 
situation of a "nuclear stalemate" be-
tween the superpowers (as a US 
Army document put it), the confron-
tation between them was perceived to 
be shifting into being "limited to low- 
or medium-intensity conflicts within 
Third World countries, as in Afghani-
stan and Vietnam, or to support for 
third parties against the other's cli-
ents" (US Army Training and Doc-
trine Command 1986: 3). 
LIC was thus portrayed as a re-
action to a perceived strategic stale-
mate between the superpowers, 
which made direct confrontation be-
tween them seem too risky and im-
practicable, encouraging a shift of 
venue for possible conflicts to the 
Third World. Quite often the Soviet 
Union was blamed for instability in 
the Third World and threats to West-
ern interests there and accused of de-
liberately employing LIC strategies as 
forms of low-level warfare against the 
United States in order to prevent the 
latter from responding on a large 
scale. In this context LIC strategies 
fused two aspects: they were develop-
ing a set of political-military tools to 
deal with anti-US Third World insta-
bility und local threats to US interests, 
and they integrated these tools into an 
ideological framework of anti-
communism. Interestingly, the embel-
lished Cold War ideology was used to 
explain and legitimize political-
military practices that by far preceded 
the Cold War, and to some degree 
even the Soviet Union’s existence.  
In the opinion of US strategists 
in the 1980s, LIC was neither harmless 
nor of little importance; instead, it 
was perceived as a Soviet strategy for 
waging global war against the United 
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States without the latter noticing. 
Then Secretary of Defense Caspar 
Weinberger expressed this viewpoint 
quite clearly at a conference he ar-
ranged on the subject of low-intensity 
conflict in early 1986: "Today's world 
is in a state of war. It is not a world 
war, although it is taking place 
throughout the world. It is not a war 
between fully mobilized armies, al-
though it is not less destructive. [...] 
Today one in every four countries in 
the world is at war. In practically 
every case, the face of these wars is 
hidden behind a mask. And in practi-
cally every case, the Soviet Union and 
those who do the work for it are hid-
ing behind this mask" (Weinberger 
1986: 1 et sqq.). 
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In official military publications, 
this alarmist perspective was less 
strongly developed. The US Army’s 
Field Manual “Operations in Low-
Intensity Conflict” (FM 100-20, pub-
lished in 1990) for instance formu-
lated: 
“US and Soviet interests also impact on what 
would otherwise be local conflicts or power 
shifts. The Soviets are not responsible for all 
conflicts in the world, but they can and do 
exploit otherwise internal conflicts to imple-
ment their global strategy. Soviet surrogates 
and client states play an important role in this 
effort. They have followed a basically oppor-
tunistic and pragmatic strategy, but are dis-
playing an increasingly sophisticated ap-
proach. This approach now includes tech-
niques for creating instability where none ex-
isted previously” (US Departments of the 
Army and the Air Force, FM 100-20 1990: 1-5). 
It is illuminating that in the 
1980s – and even after Michail Gor-
batschow became the leader of the 
Soviet Union – the US government 
perceived international relations as a 
“global war”, mostly waged in the 
Third World. The rhetoric used then 
bears close similarity to that em-
ployed to declare a “global war on 
terror” after September 11, 2001. The 
main differences are that formerly the 
Soviet Union was perceived as the 
key “rogue state”, while today we are 
offered a small selection of them, and 
that ideologically the confrontation 
shifted from anti-communism to 
fighting Muslim radicalism. 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s 
excessive rhetoric of global war and 
anti-communism decreased. The 1990 
version of Field Manual 100-20 is a 
case in point. It summarizes the main 
dangers of low-intensity warfare 
situations as: 
• “The loss of US access to strategic 
energy reserves and other natu-
ral resources 
• The loss of US military basing, 
transit, and access rights 
• The movement of US friends and 
allies to positions of accommoda-
tion with hostile groups 
• The gain of long-term advan-
tages for US adversaries” (ibid: 
1). 
This was quite a pragmatic, in-
terest-based justification of LIC, 
which lacked most of the ideological 
zeal which had been displayed during 
the Reagan Administration’s time in 
office.  
Taken together, after in the 
1970s Small Wars/ LIC/ Counterin-
surgency had been discredited, the 
new interventionist policies of the 
Reagan Administration demanded 
military strategies for Third World 
countries which took the lessons of 
Vietnam into account. Low-Intensity 
Conflict strategies were presented as 
the answer. And LIC was not just a 
new formulation of older military-
political techniques that was dis-
cussed inside the US armed forces 
alone, but it was officially sanctioned 
and supported by the US President 
himself. The National Security Deci-
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sion Directive 277 of June 15, 1987 
(formerly “secret”, but since then par-
tially declassified) was exclusively 
devoted to the US strategy for Low-
Intensity Conflict (National Security 
Council 1987: no page). It introduced 
a Board for Low-Intensity Conflict 
within the National Security Council 
and stressed both the crucial impor-
tance of LIC and the necessary inte-
gration of military with economic, 
political and informational elements. 
Its most important goal was to im-
press the military and civilian US bu-
reaucracies of the importance of LIC 
and strengthen inter-agency coopera-
tion on this matter. This point had 
been taken up even before NSDD 277 
by important sectors of the military 
brass.  
General Wallace H. Nutting, 
Commander-in-Chief of the US 
Readiness Command (USCINCRED), 
described low-intensity warfare as 
"the central strategic task facing the 
United States today" (Klare 1986: title 
page). William J. Olsen of the US 
Army War College, speaking at a 
symposium sponsored by the US Air 
Force, referred to low-intensity war-
fare as "the most urgent strategic 
problem" of the United States and 
considered it "crucial to national sur-
vival" (Olson 1985: 221). At the same 
symposium, two Air Force officers 
tersely stated, "Low-intensity conflict 
is the warfare of the future" (Johnson 
and Torres no year: 174). Then Secre-
tary of State George Schultz character-
ized LIC as "a priority challenge" con-
fronting the United States, "at least for 
the rest of this century". He added, 
"The future of peace and liberty may 
depend on how successfully we meet 
it" (Schultz 1986: 4). 
One could list many other 
comments by prominent US political 
figures and military planners who 
viewed the new concept as a crucial 
issue of the country's foreign and 
military policy. While this alone does 
not prove that their views are correct, 
there can be no denying that key offi-
cials in important government and 
military positions indeed considered 
the role of low-intensity warfare to be 
of the greatest importance. One rea-
son for this public show of support 
for LIC was to counter the reluctance 
and passive resistance towards it on 
the part of senior military officers. 
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3.3 The Role of Public Opinion 
There were important consid-
erations connected with US domestic 
politics that favored the LIC option. In 
an interview, a senior official at the 
US Department of Defense discussed 
the need for LIC. The following aspect 
was emphasized several times: "One 
of the main problems of US foreign 
policy is that since Vietnam the US 
public is no longer prepared to wage 
wars in the Third World." 
The Pentagon official went to 
say that this was a major impairment 
of the United States' capacity for ac-
tion abroad because it not only pre-
vented the exercise of certain military 
options, but also made the threat of 
large-scale military operations lack 
credibility. LIC was, he went on, an 
attempt at overcoming this difficulty. 
Low-intensity warfare was a kind of 
warfare that the United States could 
maintain over years in a specific Third 
World country at relatively low cost, 
without arousing public attention or 
concern. The relatively low inputs of 
manpower and material would 
scarcely allow the emergence of po-
litical opposition or even a polariza-
tion of US society as was the case at 
the end of the US involvement in 
Vietnam (Interview with the author). 
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Deryck Eller, addressing an Air 
University symposium on low-
intensity conflict in 1985, said, "public 
support is not absolutely necessary, 
but there must at least be a sort of 
benign indifference, especially on the 
part of the mass media. Otherwise 
Congress would be compelled to end 
the US involvement, regardless of the 
risks. If LIC can be confined to the 
lower levels of force – with very little 
bloodshed for the television cameras -
– public support or at least benign 
indifference may emerge. Something 
as boring as Internal Defense and De-
velopment [another name for counter-
insurgency: J.H.] never gets into the 
six o'clock news, especially if it is suc-
cessful" (Eller 1985: 48). 
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This argument is borne out by 
reality. If the United States simultane-
ously carries out military aid and 
training programs and low-level op-
erations in two or three dozen Third 
World countries, generally avoiding 
the use of American combat forces, 
public attention is diffused and can be 
contained more easily than if the 
United States, as in Vietnam, were to 
intervene directly and spectacularly 
with substantial force deployments 
and corresponding losses. 
In LIC campaigns, the time fac-
tor also plays a role. In the instance of 
large-scale direct military interven-
tion, domestic opposition generally 
grows stronger over time; when less 
spectacular LIC operations are carried 
out, the public ceases taking notice 
after the first flurry of interest. For 
example, the counterinsurgency cam-
paign in El Salvador evolved from a 
highly controversial undertaking be-
tween 1981 and 1983 into a matter 
that was either ignored or largely ac-
cepted, not least by Congress, after 
1985. This was due to certain apparent 
political and military successes of the 
campaign and to the fact that the di-
rect US combat role feared by critics 
was avoided. 
Other LIC operations were 
planned and implemented with do-
mestic considerations very much in 
mind. The invasion of Grenada in 
October 1983, the counterterrorist air 
raids on Libya in spring 1986, and the 
naval operations in the Persian Gulf 
which began in summer 1987 are 
some examples of this sensitivity to 
public attitudes. In terms of foreign 
policy, these operations may have 
been of little value, but they served, 
especially the first two cases, to 
strengthen the popularity of the 
Reagan administration domestically, 
while at the same time minimizing the 
risk. 
3.4 The Military in Low-
Intensity Conflict 
The above probably suffices to 
outline the fundamentals of LIC doc-
trine. It is, however, necessary to add 
two more factors: Firstly, LIC opera-
tions are frequent, while actual wars 
(i.e. medium- or high-intensity con-
flicts) are relatively few in number 
and are unlikely to increase. Since 
World War II, US troops have been 
militarily active abroad in more than 
300 cases below the threshold of war, 
whereas conflicts on the scale of the 
wars in Korea and Vietnam have been 
rare. Secondly, US planners increas-
ingly noted that the military is least 
prepared for precisely such numerous 
operations below the level of war. 
Lieutenant Colonel Donald Vought 
pointed this out as early as 1977, i.e. 
some time before the start of a broad-
based debate on low-intensity warfare 
(Vaught 1977: 17 et seqq.). 
A study prepared by Kupper-
man Associates for the US Army a 
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few years later reaches the same con-
clusion: "The US Army faces the di-
lemma that the type of conflict least 
likely to occur, i.e. extensive conven-
tional confrontation between the su-
perpowers in Europe, nonetheless 
dominates its thinking, training and 
allocation of resources. The confronta-
tions which are most likely to attract 
the Army's attention are small but 
decisive low-intensity conflicts occur-
ring on the periphery of the super-
powers. Many of these conflicts or 
protoconflicts – affect important US 
interests, regardless of whether they 
have internal causes or are controlled 
from outside: for instance in the [Per-
sian: J.H.] Gulf, in the Caribbean, in 
Africa, in the South Pacific and possi-
bly even in the United States itself. 
The Army is not prepared at present 
for such low-intensity conflicts" 
(Kupperman, Ass. 1983: VIII). 
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This reveals the general pur-
pose of the debate in low-intensity 
warfare: to adjust the entire foreign 
and military policy machinery of the 
US government, not least its armed 
forces, in line with the changed de-
ployment conditions. Within the mili-
tary, the aims of the discussion were 
to define the conditions and circum-
stances governing "low-intensity" 
operations, to develop a correspond-
ing military doctrine, to adapt mili-
tary thinking within the US military 
to these requirements and to imple-
ment the new doctrine in the recruit-
ment and training of military person-
nel and in the allocation of arms and 
equipment to the forces. 
It should be pointed out that 
neither LIC as a whole nor its ration-
ale were accepted without dispute by 
US government officials and armed 
forces personnel. The question of how 
much military weight should be lent 
to LIC was also the subject of some 
controversy. One example was the 
debate on counterterrorism within the 
US Air Force. Lieutenant Colonel 
Felix Moran considered a military 
response to terrorism both wrong and 
futile (Moran 1985: 30). Colonel Cla-
rence Herrington on the contrary ar-
gued for the use of B-52s to combat 
terrorists (Herrington 1985: 387 et 
seqq.). Clearly, he missed the point of 
LIC, but the fact remains that there 
was a heated debate over the priority 
given to, as well as the scope and the 
nature of, its military component. 
Second, under the Reagan ad-
ministration, the non-military priori-
ties of LIC were often proclaimed, but 
not always implemented. It cannot be 
ignored that LIC was often, in prac-
tice, progressively militarized. Simple 
"military solutions" to complex politi-
cal problems were part of Reaganite 
thinking. The political aspects of LIC 
to some had a distinct Carter-era tinge 
– it seemed to smack of the former 
presidents' human rights policy 
(Hippler 1984: 45-69) – and thus ran 
counter to some of the political in-
stincts of numerous Reaganites (cf. 
Senator Jesse Helms's description of 
land reform in El Salvador as an ele-
ment of counterinsurgency as "com-
munist"). Furthermore, many US offi-
cers had definite reservations about 
the civilian LIC elements (occasionally 
about the military ones as well) be-
cause these do not accord with their 
training, experience, ideology and 
qualifications. In sum, it can be stated 
that under the Reagan Administra-
tion, the political and social aspects of 
LIC tended to be de-emphasized in 
favor of the military. 
Finally, even in "political" LIC 
programs, the military aspect is in-
dispensable. LIC does not imply re-
placing "military solutions" with "po-
litical solutions" as much as eliminat-
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different from conventional military 
operations. It is therefore not surpris-
ing that regular military units are not 
optimally trained and equipped for 
these functions. This was one of the 
realizations that initiated the entire 
debate on low-intensity warfare. The 
US units with the greatest competence 
in unconventional operations and 
low-intensity warfare are the so-called 
Special Operations Forces (SOF), 
made up of the three branches of the 
military (For an attempt of a strategist 
in 1990 to project LIC and Special Op-
erations Forces into the future, see: 
Paschall 1990). Since the beginning of 
the Reagan administration the SOF, 
and counterparts in other countries, 
have been considerably enlarged and 
given additional weapons and 
equipment (Hippler 1986: 85-97). 
ing the distinction between "military" 
and "civilian". Such clearly "non-
military" conduct as labor strikes and 
demonstrations have been interpreted 
as "low-intensity warfare", while, on 
the other hand, the military may as-
sume "civilian" tasks (civic action). 
Consequently, under LIC conditions, 
civilian practices tend to be milita-
rized, and military or non-military 
measures, taken by the armed forces 
of the United States and/or the local 
government, will be of decisive im-
portance for any LIC program. Ensur-
ing local "security" with the military 
and the police is a measure without 
which any pacification program is 
bound to fail. 
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As has already been stated, LIC 
operations are, by their nature, quite  
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4. Military Operations Other than War 
(MOOTW) and Stability and Support 
Operations 
The term “low-intensity war-
fare” (or “low-intensity conflict”) has 
hardly been used since the early 
1990s. It generally was replaced by 
“Military Operations Other than War” 
(MOOTW; or, to use a somewhat 
shorter form, “Operations Other than 
War, OOTW) (For a technical over-
view see: Bonn/Baker 2000). Termino-
logical plurality and sometimes con-
fusion still exists, and this has been 
recognized in parts of the military 
community. After summarizing offi-
cial US military terminology, the Cen-
ter for Emerging Threats and Oppor-
tunities of the US Marine Corps, for 
instance, remarked: 
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“All of these descriptions, definitions, and 
charts leave room for confusion and misun-
derstanding. Even though the term “military 
operations other than war” exists in the cur-
rent official joint lexicon and is commonly 
used throughout the Defense Department, the 
term itself truly is a misnomer and vestige 
from the past. [...] The way the term is used 
also is confusing – is it a capability, a type of 
operation, a time-frame, or an environment in 
which these capabilities or operations are per-
formed? It often is used to mean all three” 
(US Marine Corps 2004: 4). 
Also, some of the overlapping 
terms of earlier times are still being 
used, such as “Foreign Internal De-
fense” (FID), “Nation Assistance”, 
Counterinsurgency and others which 
generally refer to specific aspects of 
MOOTW. Lately new terms have 
been coined, such as “Stability and 
Support Operations”, taking the place 
of what was previously called LIC 
and MOOTW. An example is given by 
the latest version (dated February 
2003) of Field Manual FM 100-20 
(which was formerly titled “Military 
Operations in Low Intensity Con-
flict”), now published as FM 3-07 un-
der the name of “Stability Operations 
and Support Operations” (US De-
partment of the Army 2003: no page 
given). This document explicitly re-
fers to MOOTW only twice in its more 
than 230 pages (and both times only 
briefly on its first page) and to low-
intensity conflict not at all – while at 
the same time these are exactly the 
topics the Field Manual is dealing 
with in substance.  
Similarly, the basic US Army 
Field Manual FM 3-0 “Operations”, 
published in June 2001, rarely men-
tions MOOTW (or counterinsurgency) 
by name, but devotes two chapters to 
stability and to support operations 
(US Department of the Army 2001).14
At least until now, the term 
“Military Operations Other Than 
War” (MOOTW) has generally taken 
the place of LIC, at least since 1995, 
when the US Joint Chiefs of Staff pub-
lished their “Joint Doctrine for Mili-
tary Operations Other Than War” as 
Joint Publication (JP) 3-07 (US Joint 
Chiefs of Staff 1995). But the new ter-
minological transformation of Small 
Wars, LIC and MOOTW into “Stabil-
ity Operations and Support Opera-
tions” seems to be well under way. 
Still, we will start by explaining 
MOOTW first, before moving on to 
this latest twist in doctrine develop-
ment. 
                                                     
14  For putting FM 3-0 into context of doc-
trine development, see: Burke 2002: 91-97. 
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4.1 Exit the Cold War: 
Conceptual Starting Points 
MOOTW doctrine in JP 3-07 
and other documents starts with ex-
plaining the link between MOOTW 
and US national security objectives. 
Generally, three main functions with 
regard to these objectives are men-
tioned: deterrence, forward presence, 
and crisis response. This is summa-
rized in the chart on this page.  
This categorization is obviously 
of a very general character, but de-
spite this leaves little room for some 
of the key components of MOOTW, 
such as counterinsurgency, pro-
insurgency and counterterrorism. 
While it is possible to place them un-
der the heading of “crisis response” in 
principle, the categories listed there 
do not exactly invite this. Also, some 
of the more general descriptions of 
MOOTW in the JP 3-07 (published 
during the Clinton Presidency) project 
a different starting point from that of 
the LIC doctrine of the Reagan years. 
“MOOTW encompass the use of mili-
tary capabilities across the range of military 
operations short of war. […] MOOTW focus on  
 
deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting 
peace, and supporting civil authorities in re-
sponse to domestic crises” (ibid: I-1). 
This introduction of MOOTW 
may not constitute a break with pre-
vious LIC doctrine, but it still creates 
quite a different emphasis. While 
formerly the language had often been 
somewhat alarmist or even militant in 
regard to LIC (like: "total war at the 
social base" of a country; “politico-
military struggle to attain political, 
military, social, economic or psycho-
logical objectives”; or, as then-
Secretary of Defense Weinberger put 
it: “ Today's world is in a state of war. 
[…] It is not a war between fully mo-
bilized armies, although it is not less 
destructive”) the new goals of “pro-
moting peace” and “resolving con-
flict” sound much softer. And while 
the new statement of purpose has a 
nearly pacifistic ring, MOOTW is 
clearly nothing like it. Generally, three 
categories are distinguished: 
MOOTW involving the use or the 
threat of force, MOOTW not involv-
ing the use or threat of force, and si-
multaneous operations, which include 
combat and non-combat operations. 
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Counterterrorism and Counter-
insurgency/Nation Assistance are 
explicitly mentioned as components 
of MOOTW, while interestingly pro-
insurgency (which was a key compo-
nent of the “Reagan Doctrine”) is not.  
In many regards, early 
MOOTW doctrine did connect to its 
LIC predecessor, especially in regard 
to its emphasis of the political aspects. 28 
“MOOTW may involve elements of both 
combat and non-combat operations in peace-
time, conflict, and war situations. MOOTW 
involving combat, such as peace enforcement, 
may have many of the same characteristics of 
war, including active combat operations and 
employment of most combat capabilities. All 
military operations are driven by political 
considerations. However, MOOTW are more 
sensitive to such considerations due to the 
overriding goal to prevent, preempt, or limit 
potential hostilities. In MOOTW, political 
considerations permeate all levels and the 
military may not be the primary player. As a 
result, these operations normally have more 
restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) than in 
war” (ibid: I-1). 
4.2 General Principles of 
MOOTW 
While this confirms principles 
that we have discussed before, like 
the centrality of political aspects in 
Operations Other Than War (or its 
predecessors) and the resulting need 
to limit the degree of force and vio-
lence and restrict the rules of en-
gagement, MOOTW doctrine added 
some ideas which in themselves were 
not new, but had not been explicitly 
been integrated into LIC, or at least 
only had to a lesser degree. We have 
already mentioned “deterrence” and 
“forward presence” as starting points 
for MOOTW, which are not at all 
MOOTW-specific but reflect more 
traditional military thinking.  
MOOTW doctrine, more than 
the military doctrines of the 1980s, 
insists on applying conventional prin-
ciples of warfare, though in a modi-
fied way. Some of these are even ele-
vated to being “Principles of Military 
Operations Other Than War”, as 
shown in the next chart.  
These principles are again quite 
general. To undertake any operation – 
including MOOTW – with a clearly 
defined and attainable objective and 
operate in an integrated and unified 
way definitely is a reasonable ap-
proach, but again not exactly 
MOOTW-specific. The same applies 
to the other principles enumerated: 
ignoring security or acting without 
restraint in situations of military op-
erations would obviously be a bad 
idea.15 Generally, the new terminol-
ogy does not break with LIC doctrine, 
but shifts the emphasis somewhat 
back to more traditional and conven-
tional ways of military thinking. 
The principle of pursuing a 
clear objective seems trivial, but given 
military experience it is not. Since 
political considerations are decisive in 
MOOTW, the overriding objective of 
a military operation a) has to be de-
fined by the political leadership; b) 
should not be vague or contradictory 
in itself; c) should be translated into 
clear and realistic military objectives; 
and d) should not implicitly be 
changed or broadened in the course of 
operations without clearly and under-
standably redefining points a)-d). One 
of the problems for military leaders is 
that the political definitions of objec-
tives and their degree of clarity and 
contradictoriness are outside their 
own reach, since they are determined 
by civilian political leaders, ultimately 
by the US President, his representa-
tives or the US Congress. If the politi-
                                                     
15  For a more detailed discussion of the 
principles mentioned see: US Joint Chiefs of 
Staff 1995: II-1 through II-5. 
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cal goals are less than clear, contradic-
tory or vague, military leaders can 
hardly translate them into clear mili-
tary objectives. JP 3-07 demands: 
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(Figure: US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doc-
trine for Military Operations Other Than War, 
JP 3-07, Washington, 16 June 1995, p.II-2) 
“Direct every military operation toward a 
clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objec-
tive. JFCs [Joint Forces Commanders: J.H.] 
must understand the strategic aims, set ap-
propriate objectives, and ensure that these 
aims and objectives contribute to unity of ef-
fort” (ibid: II-1 et sqq.). 
“The political objectives which military objec-
tives are based on may not specifically ad-
dress the desired military end state. JFCs 
should, therefore, translate their political 
guidance into appropriate military objectives 
through a rigorous and continuous mission 
and threat analysis. JFCs should carefully ex-
plain to political authorities the implications 
of political decisions on capabilities and risk 
to military forces. … Change to initial mili-
tary objectives may occur because political 
and military leaders gain a better understand-
ing of the situation, or it may occur because 
the situation itself changes. JFCs should be 
aware of shifts in the political objectives, or in 
the situation itself, that necessitate a change 
in the military objective. These changes may 
be very subtle, yet they still require adjust-
ment of the military objectives. If this adjust-
ment is not made, the military objectives may 
no longer support the political objectives, le-
gitimacy may be undermined, and force secu-
rity may be compromised” (ibid: II-2 et sqq.). 
One of the important problems 
in translating political objectives into 
military ones is the tendency of politi-
cal leaders to use a vague language 
that aims more at domestic or interna-
tional public relations, and not at 
guiding military operations. For in-
stance, “regime change”, “establish-
ing or strengthening democracy” or 
“ending a humanitarian catastrophe” 
may sound nice, but are not specific 
enough to be translated into clear 
objectives for military operations. 
They invite a situation where success-
ful military operations do not neces-
sarily contribute to political goals and 
might even lead to disaster. But there 
is very little the armed forces can do 
about this, except appealing to the 
political leadership to be more specific 
and to set political objectives realisti-
cally.  
While in conventional war the 
objective for the armed forces is gen-
erally quite clear – destruction of the 
enemy and victory in military terms – 
in MOOTW it often is not, since it is a 
politico-military undertaking, where 
political considerations guide and 
limit military operations. A specific 
danger in this respect is mission 
creep,16 which means a set of objec-
tives which gradually shifts because 
of the dynamics of the operation itself, 
which may lead to the development 
of a set of sub-objectives in contradic-
tion with each other, or with the po-
litically defined goals. This will hap-
pen the more easily the less clearly the 
political objectives are defined, or in 
the case that the political objectives 
change subtly or openly (see US De-
partment of the Army 2003:1-17 et 
sqq.) because of foreign policy or do-
mestic considerations. Mission creep 
is much more likely in MOOTW con-
                                                     
16  For a general background and a critique 
on mission creep see: Siegel 1998.  
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texts than in conventional military 
operations, and also much more dan-
gerous to the integrity of the opera-
tion. 
For the purpose of our discus-
sion the principle of “legitimacy” is 
also quite interesting, since it is of 
special importance in MOOTW. 
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“In MOOTW, legitimacy is a condition based 
on the perception by a specific audience of 
the legality, morality, or rightness of a set of 
actions. This audience may be the US public, 
foreign nations, the populations in the area of 
responsibility/joint operations area 
(AOR/JOA), or the participating forces. If an 
operation is perceived as legitimate, there is a 
strong impulse to support the action. If an opera-
tion is not perceived as legitimate, the actions 
may not be supported and may be actively 
resisted. In MOOTW, legitimacy is frequently a 
decisive element. The prudent use of psycho-
logical operations (PSYOP) and humanitarian 
and civic assistance (HCA) programs assists 
in developing a sense of legitimacy for the 
supported government” (US Joint Chiefs of 
Staff 1995: II-5 et sqq. Emphasis in the origi-
nal document). 
Indeed, legitimacy can be key 
to success or failure, because 
MOOTW is at core a political under-
taking. If the US public does not ac-
cept the legitimacy of a military op-
eration abroad, domestic support or at 
least tolerance will decline and create 
potential problems with politically 
sustaining the military effort. If le-
gitimacy is lacking internationally, the 
foreign policy context of an operation 
can be much more difficult, and find-
ing allies a major problem, as the Iraq 
war demonstrated. And if the public 
of the target country does not accept 
the legitimacy of the US operation, it 
will be quite impossible to win “the 
hearts and minds” of a population, 
and general resistance to US troops 
might result. 
Max Manwaring put it like this 
in a study for the US Army War Col-
lege: 
“The data show that the moral right of a re-
gime to govern is the most important single 
dimension in a counterguerrilla war. Thus, a 
politically strong and morally legitimate gov-
ernment is vital to any winning internal war 
strategy. The rectitude and legitimacy of the 
incumbent regime is the primary target – the 
primary center of gravity – as far as the in-
surgent organization is concerned. … A coun-
terinsurgency campaign that fails to under-
stand the lack of rectitude and morally le-
gitimate governance problem and responds 
only to “enemy” military forces is very likely 
to fail” (Manwaring 2001: 19). 
4.3 Types of Operations in 
MOOTW 
From general principles 
MOOTW doctrine moves to the spe-
cific types of operations. 
16 different types are enumer-
ated. While LIC doctrine had gener-
ally focussed on counterinsurgency, 
pro-insurgency, counterterrorism and 
an omnibus category of “other opera-
tions”, MOOTW retains the first three 
types of operations, though under 
slightly different names: Nation As-
sistance/Support to Counterinsur-
gency, Support to Insurgency, and 
Combating Terrorism; the remaining 
omnibus category is dropped and 
differentiated into 13 categories, 
which before had been lumped to-
gether: Counterdrug Operations, 
Humanitarian Assistance, Evacuation 
Operations, Peace operations, Strikes 
and Raids, and Show of Force Opera-
tions, among others. Military Support 
to Civil Authorities is also promoted 
to be a distinct type of MOOTW (US 
Joint Chiefs of Staff 1995: III-1 to III-
15).17  
It is clear that there is little or 
no difference between the kinds of 
operations that LIC and MOOTW are 
                                                     
17  See also: US Department of the Air Force 
2000: 9-22; see also: US Joint Chiefs of Staff 
2001: chapter V. 
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supposed to conceptualize, and that 
only the different types of operations 
are grouped differently. The advan-
tage of the new set-up lies in the more 
complete listing of all categories, 
while the older LIC doctrine was 
more convincing in regard to clarify-
ing priorities. It is slightly surprising, 
for instance, that early MOOTW doc-
trine lists the potential types of opera-
tions in alphabetical order, not ac-
cording to priorities or importance.  
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For our analysis the category of 
“Nation Assistance/Support to Coun-
terinsurgency” is of key importance. 
JP 3-07 differentiates Nation 
Assistance into three sub-categories: 
• Security Assistance, “by which the 
United States provides defense 
articles, military training, and 
other defense-related services to 
foreign nations by grant, loan, 
credit, or cash sales in further-
ance of national policies and ob-
jectives”. 
• Foreign Internal Defense (FID), 
which “encompass the total po-
litical, economic, informational, 
and military support provided to 
another nation to assist its fight 
against subversion and insur-
gency. […] US FID programs 
may address other threats to an 
HN’s internal stability, such as 
civil disorder, illicit drug traffick-
ing, and terrorism. […] US mili-
tary support to FID may include 
training, materiel, advice, or 
other assistance, including direct 
support and combat operations 
as authorized by the NCA, to HN 
forces in executing an IDAD pro-
gram.” 
• Humanitarian and civic assistance 
“is provided in conjunction with 
military operations and exercises, 
and must fulfill unit training re-
quirements that incidentally cre-
ate humanitarian benefit to the 
local populace.” Those explicitly 
mentioned are medical, dental, 
and veterinary care provided in 
rural areas of a country; con-
struction of rudimentary surface 
transportation systems; well-
drilling and construction of basic 
sanitation facilities, and rudi-
mentary construction and repair 
of public facilities (US Joint 
Chiefs of Staff 1995: III-10). 
This categorization of “Nation 
Assistance/ Counterinsurgency” again 
does not break with previous con-
cepts and doctrine, but it structures 
MOOTW components somewhat dif-
ferently compared to LIC. And also, 
the term counterinsurgency, while 
present, is much less prominent.  
4.4 Stability Operations and 
Support Operations 
The term of “Stability Opera-
tions and Support Operations” is not 
completely new. As early as 1995 the 
US Army published a Field Manual 
“Army Operational Support” (US 
Department of the Army 1995) where 
the term Support Operation was used 
in a different and more technical way 
than afterwards. But in June 1997 a 
Training Circular was published, 
which dealt with precisely the topics 
that were discussed as MOOTW at the 
time. It did not use the term MOOTW 
even once in its 930 pages, but fea-
tured the term “Stability Operations 
and Support Operations”, including 
in its title (US Department of the 
Army 1997b). However, only in 2001 
did the new term become officially 
recognized as being of high impor-
tance, when the keystone US Army 
Field Manual FM 3-0 “Operations” 
rarely mentioned the term MOOTW 
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(nine times in more than 300 pages), 
while devoting one full chapter to 
“Stability Operations” and another 
one to “Support Operations” (US De-
partment of the Army 2001) Two 
years later the new terminology was 
further reinforced when a complete 
Field Manual (FM 3-07) was devoted 
exclusively to Stability Operations 
and Support Operations, (US De-
partment of the Army 2003) replacing 
the former Field Manual FM 100-20 
(“Low-Intensity Conflict”).  
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Both FM 3-0 and FM 3-07 cate-
gorize the potential types of military 
operations somewhat differently than 
had been done before. They list four 
basic categories of operations: defen-
sive and offensive operations, which 
both apply to war, and stability and 
support operations, which previously 
had jointly been called LIC or 
MOOTW. In the words of FM 3-0: 
“Full spectrum operations include offensive, 
defensive, stability, and support operations. 
Missions in any environment require Army 
forces prepared to conduct any combination 
of these operations: 
• Offensive operations aim at destroying or 
defeating an enemy. Their purpose is to 
impose US will on the enemy and 
achieve decisive victory. 
• Defensive operations defeat an enemy at-
tack, buy time, economize forces, or 
develop conditions favorable for offen-
sive operations. Defensive operations 
alone normally cannot achieve a deci-
sion. Their purpose is to create condi-
tions for a counteroffensive that allows 
Army forces to regain the initiative. 
• Stability operations promote and protect 
US national interests by influencing the 
threat, political, and information di-
mensions of the operational environ-
ment through a combination of peace-
time developmental, cooperative activi-
ties and coercive actions in response to 
crisis. Regional security is supported by 
a balanced approach that enhances re-
gional stability and economic prosper-
ity simultaneously. Army force pres-
ence promotes a stable environment. 
• Support operations employ Army forces 
to assist civil authorities, foreign or 
domestic, as they prepare for or re-
spond to crisis and relieve suffering” 
(US Department of the Army 2001: 1-15 
et sqq.). 
FM 3-07 is not just an edited 
version of LIC and MOOTW doctrine. 
While preserving much of their sub-
stance, it provides a new framework 
for these kinds of operations, taking 
into account the strategic changes that 
had happened after the end of the 
Cold War. In the same way as FM 3-0, 
Field Manual 3-07 finally discards the 
remnants of Cold War thinking that 
had stubbornly persisted during the 
1990s, and develops a rationale for the 
US armed forces – and Stability and 
Support Operations – which is much 
less ideological than former anti-
communist thought and rooted in a 
new definition of US self-interest.  
“Few states will have the resources, or the 
need, to attack the US directly in the near fu-
ture. However, many will challenge it for 
control or dominance of a region. Potential 
adversaries may increasingly resort to asym-
metric means to threaten our national inter-
ests. Such methods include unconventional, 
unexpected, innovative, or disproportional 
means used to gain an advantage. Adversar-
ies may use inexpensive approaches that cir-
cumvent the US strengths, exploit its vulner-
abilities, or confront it in ways the US cannot 
match in kind. Contemporary threats include 
terrorism; chemical, biological, radiological, 
nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) 
threats; information operations; exploitation 
of commercial or space-based systems; denial 
of our access to critical resources; and envi-
ronmental sabotage” (ibid). 
These are plain words: instead 
of ideological and moral bombast, US 
interests are at stake, such as “control 
or dominance of a region” or “access 
to markets and materials”. And since 
the US is militarily and politically 
difficult to confront directly, potential 
adversaries will look for feasible and 
cost-effective ways to pursue their 
own interest: they will look for 
“asymmetric means to threaten our 
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national interests”. While many out-
side the US will ask whether US con-
trol of their respective region and 
access of the United States to their 
resources is legitimate or acceptable, it 
is difficult not to understand the ra-
tionale behind this statement. The 
next step in the argument is to look at 
the conditions in which these US 
goals are to be pursued. Here it is 
worth quoting from FM 3-07 at length 
and in context: 
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“Nation states will continue to be the primary 
political unit for the foreseeable future. Yet 
the process of globalization is changing the 
nature of state-to-state relations as the reach 
of nonstate actors, multinational corpora-
tions, and international organizations in-
creases. Shifting and unstable power balances 
at the national and subnational levels in the 
Balkans, Middle East, and throughout Africa 
and Asia threaten to engage the vital interests 
of the United States.  
Some forms of nationalism can cause inter- 
and intrastate conflict. Nationalist move-
ments arise from the belief that nations bene-
fit from acting independently rather than col-
lectively, emphasizing national rather than 
international goals. Many sources of national-
ist identity exist, including ethnic, religious, 
tribal, historical, or territorial. Such move-
ments are replacing ideologically based iden-
tities. In some cases, these movements are 
closely linked to criminal organizations. 
These movements may also cause regional 
strife, as one nation seeks to extend its au-
thority over adjacent groups or territory. … 
Some in the non-Western world reject West-
ern political and cultural values. In some in-
stances, regimes that use Western political 
forms of government are under attack by 
ethnic, religious, and nationalist groups seek-
ing to establish or reestablish their identity. 
As tribal, nationalist, or religious movements 
compete with Western models of govern-
ment, instability can increase. This instability 
threatens not only Western interests within 
the state, but often threatens to spill across 
borders” (US Department of the Army 2003: 
1-10 et sqq.). 
Using the changing role of the 
nation-state, sub-national instability, 
and globalization as starting points is 
not that different from many discus-
sions in the academic community, and 
nor is the emphasis on ethnic and 
national identities as factors in re-
gional conflict. The point for the US 
army here, though, is not these devel-
opments as such but the fact that they 
“threaten Western interest within the” 
– foreign – “state”, and can also do so 
regionally. An extra paragraph is re-
served for the problem of “ungovern-
ability”. It is explained that the 
“global economy can render economic 
policies and controls ineffective” and 
that some governments therefore “fail 
to provide economic stability and 
security for their populace”. The 
problem of rising unemployment is 
mentioned in this context. And, re-
turning to a topic and terminology 
already present in the Small Wars and 
LIC discussions, the field manual em-
phasizes that “immature government 
infrastructures in developing democ-
racies can cause expectations to be 
unmet, often leading to conflict” 
(ibid). 
Again, this is an intelligent way 
to perceive some of the conditions 
leading to local and regional conflict, 
where the global economy is eroding 
the internal stability of so many coun-
tries. The problem of governance in-
deed is a key problem of creating sta-
bility and overcoming violence in 
numerous societies. As we can see, 
Cold War thinking has been suc-
ceeded by a more modern and more 
appropriate way to define a country's 
own strategic environment. We might 
ask why these important factors were 
been recognized by the US armed 
forces much earlier, since they are not 
exactly new and did not start in 2000. 
But we should remind ourselves that 
many academics have also been hyp-
notized by traditional Cold War 
thinking. A little later the manual is 
even talking about a “modified con-
cept of the enemy” and demands rea-
sonably: “Commanders must take 
care to not create an enemy where one 
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does not exist” (ibid: 1-16). And FM 3-
0 puts it like this: “The “enemy,” for 
example, may be a set of ambiguous 
threats and potential adversaries” (US 
Department of the Army 2001: 9-5). 
US forces have come a long 
way from the time when they were 
supposed to see the hand of “Mos-
cow” behind anything in the Third 
World they did not like or perceived 
as destabilizing.  34 
The analysis of the strategic en-
vironment in FM 3-07, besides the 
aspects already mentioned (“balance 
of power”, “nationalism”, “clash of 
culture”, “ungovernability”), high-
lights demographic trends, environ-
mental risks, and propaganda. It then 
moves on to stress that stability and 
support operations “often take place 
in political, military, and cultural 
situations that are highly fluid and 
dynamic. Unresolved political issues, 
an unclear understanding or descrip-
tion of a desired end state, or diffi-
culty in gaining international consen-
sus may cause ambiguity” (US De-
partment of the Army 2003: 1-10, 1-
11). 
4.5 Types of Operations in 
Stability Operations 
Field Manual 3-0 mentions ten 
categories of Stability Operations, 
which are quite similar to the former  
MOOTW categories, with the excep-
tion that Domestic Support Opera-
tions (DSO), which constitute US mili-
tary forces' operation inside the US to 
support civilian authorities, for in-
stance in case of a humanitarian crisis 
or natural disaster) and Foreign Hu-
manitarian Assistance (FHA) are sin-
gled out as constituting Support Op-
erations. The former categories of 
enforcing sanctions/maritime inter-
cept operations, enforcing exclusion 
zones, ensuring freedom of naviga-
tion and overflight, and the protection 
of shipping that were included in the 
MOOTW types as defined by the US 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (US Joint Chiefs of 
Staff 1995: III-1 to III-15; see also: US 
Department of the Air Force 2000: 9-
22) are missing here. How-ever, this is 
not very surprising, since as an Army 
manual the protection of shipping 
and overflight can hardly be impor-
tant types of operation. Generally, 
there is very little difference between 
MOOTW and Stability/Support Op-
erations in regard to what they in-
clude, with the minor difference that 
the operational types have been 
grouped into two categories instead 
of one. The following chart provides 
an overview of the development of 
operational emphasis and types of 
operations from Small Wars to Stabil-
ity Operations. The changing political 
contexts are included. 
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Overview: From Small Wars to Stability Operations 
 Political context 
Ideology/ 
Legitimation 
Political 
Emphasis 
Main Types of 
Operations, 
according to 
Doctrine 
Small Wars 
imperial domina-
tion, primarily in 
Central America, 
the Caribbean and 
parts of Pacific/Asia 
little emphasis on ide-
ology; uninhibited 
sense of mission with 
regard to own cultural 
superiority 
occupation or 
control of coun-
tries or areas, 
counterinsur-
gency 
counterinsur-
gency, 
occupation,  
miscellaneous 
LIC final phase of cold 
war, Reaganism 
activist anti-
communism, including 
rhetoric of anti-
communist “liberation” 
(“Reagan Doctrine”) 
pro-insurgency, 
counterinsur-
gency, briefly 
counterterror-
ism 
counterinsur-
gency, pro-
insurgency, coun-
terterrorism, 
surgical conven-
tional strikes, 
miscellaneous 
MOOTW 
transition from 
Cold-War to Post-
Cold War era 
shifting ideology, “in-
stability”, “humanitar-
ian crises” among le-
gitimations of force 
counterinsur-
gency, with 
peace keeping 
and peace 
enforcing 
16 different cate-
gories, in sub-
stance like types of 
LIC operations 
Stability 
and 
Support 
Operations 
Post Cold War, 
“war against terror-
ism” 
fighting terrorism, 
Muslim extremism, 
supporting “freedom” 
counterterror-
ism, counterin-
surgency 
12 different cate-
gories, , in sub-
stance like types of 
LIC and MOOTW 
operations 
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4.6 Return to Traditional 
Military Thinking? 
All things considered, MOOTW 
is in principle a different term for LIC, 
without adding much change in sub-
stance. But still there are some shifts 
in language and emphasis that should 
not be overlooked. While LIC doctrine 
had been introduced with some fan-
fare and in some degree had been 
pressed upon the military brass by the 
political leadership, MOOTW was 
presented in more low-key ways. In a 
sense, both its political importance 
and its political elements were 
stressed to a lesser degree, and it was 
made more digestible to traditional 
and conventional officers by linking it 
to the language and principles of tra-
ditional rules of warfare. MOOTW 
was less explicit and less detailed in 
regard to its non-military, political 
aspects, especially in regard to the 
need and means to get involved in 
questions of governance in the target 
countries. The shift of terminology 
from MOOTW to “Stability Opera-
tions and Support Operations” has 
even strengthened this trend. 
After FM 3-07 has discussed the 
functions and strategic environment 
of stability and support operations in 
a way that emphasized non-military 
factors like political, economic, social, 
environmental and other factors, it is 
somewhat surprising that in the last 
six pages of its first chapter the man-
ual presents a quite conventional mili-
tary approach to deal with these prob-
lems. Compared to MOOTW and 
even more to LIC doctrine the new 
concept of stability and support op-
erations heavily draws on traditional 
military thinking and to a great de-
gree ignores its own, non-military 
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analysis. While it does include lan-
guage to stress the socio-political 
character of stability and support op-
erations, few practical lessons are 
drawn from this, while general and 
conventional principles of war are put 
forward. These principles include 
unity of objective (which we discussed 
before in the context of MOOTW), the 
need for offensive (“seize, retain, and 
exploit the initiative”), mass (“concen-
trate the effects of combat power at 
the decisive place and time”), economy 
of force, maneuver (“place the enemy in 
a disadvantageous position through 
the flexible application of combat 
power”), unity of command, security 
(“never permit the enemy to acquire 
an unexpected advantage”), surprise 
and simplicity (US Department of the 
Army 2003: 1-20). Also, the need for 
initiative, agility, depth (in regard to 
time, space and resources), synchro-
nization and versatility are stressed, 
which all sounds nice and obvious, 
but is very general and does not con-
tribute to the specifics of MOOTW or 
stability and support operations. The 
general principles of war (taken from 
FM 3-0 “operations”, and comple-
mented by “Considerations for Stabil-
ity Operations”18) are mechanically 
transferred to political and non-
combat operations, which had been 
explicitly called “operations other than 
war” only shortly before. FM 3-07 
does not resolve this contradiction, 
but sometimes even expresses it 
clearly. In some paragraphs the man-
ual concedes that “stability operations 
and support operations differ from the 
offense and defense [meaning war: J.H.] 
in significant ways” (US Department 
of the Army 2003: 1-15). 
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But in quite a few other para-
graphs the picture gets blurred. For 
                                                     
18  US Department of the Army 2001:9-14 to 
9-17. 
instance FM 3-07 states that “like all 
operations” (ibid: 1-3), stability and 
support operations are sensitive to 
political considerations – which obvi-
ously ignores the key differences. The 
manual speaks of the need to “en-
hance host-nation credibility and le-
gitimacy”, but adds that this should 
be achieved “by demonstrating the 
proper respect for the host-nation 
government, police, and military 
forces” (ibid: 1-4, see also US Depart-
ment of the Army 2001: 9-15). Show-
ing this kind of respect is surely a 
good idea, but hardly enough, if these 
kinds of operations are basically po-
litical and aim at winning hearts and 
minds of the population, or aim to 
“promote sustainable and responsive 
institutions” (ibid: 1-14) that might 
not even exist.  
These examples express a gen-
eral trend, which is formulated quite 
openly: “The tenets of army opera-
tions build on the principles of war” 
(ibid 1-21) – which might not be a 
good idea in “operations other than 
war”. And Field Manual FM 3-0 “Op-
erations” even uses the following 
formulation: “Conducting stability 
operations is identical to conducting 
offensive, defensive, and support op-
erations.” (US Department of the 
Army 2001: 9-14) Which obviously it 
is not, as has been explained time and 
again in several relevant Field Manu-
als. 
Also, right at the beginning of 
FM 3-07 it brags: 
“The characteristics that make our Army a 
premier warfighting organization also serve it 
well in conducting stability operations and 
support operations” (US Department of the 
Army 2003: 1-1). 
This kind of wishful thinking is 
hard to understand after more than 
twenty years of doctrine develop-
ment, discussion and experiences in 
operations, which include counterin-
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surgency, peace-keeping and disaster 
relief. It would be interesting to know 
whether the US army would repeat 
these boastful statements after the 
Iraq experience. 
It is obvious that the US armed 
forces have serious homework to do. 
It would be highly advisable to finally 
link their often quite realistic analysis 
of causes and dynamics of insurgen-
cies to their own strategy and tactics. 
If strategy is not deduced from the 
analysis it will just develop out of 
bureaucratic tradition and military 
culture. And this implies that it is 
ignoring the hard reality on the 
ground. 
 
37
 
Jochen Hippler 
 
5. Counterinsurgency 
Up to now, we have mostly 
dealt with general questions of Small 
Wars, LIC doctrine, and MOOTW, 
especially with their historical and 
analytical development. Our next step 
will be to focus on Counterinsurgency 
(COIN), which has been a cornerstone 
of Small Wars and LIC then “Military 
Operations Other than War” 
(MOOTW) and “Support Opera-
tions”, during the last couple of years. 
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To analyze this concept of 
counterinsurgency, we will focus to a 
great extent on four official docu-
ments produced by the US Marine 
Corps und the US Army: “Counterin-
surgency Operations”, published as 
Field Manual FMFM 8-2 in January  
1980 (and re-named as MCWP 3-33.5 
in October of 2004), “Counterguerrilla 
Operations” (FM 90-8 / MCRP 3-33A) 
of August 1986, “Counterinsurgency 
Operations”, published as Field Man-
ual-Interim, FMI 3-07.22 in October 
2004 (to expire in October 2006), and 
again “Stability Operations and Sup-
port Operations”, published as Field 
Manual FM 3-07 (substituting FM 100-
20) in February 2003. Other material 
will also be considered, generally of 
very recent publication date.  
This chapter therefore moves 
from providing historical background 
and doctrine development to outlin-
ing the current state of military think-
ing in regard to a key type of opera-
tion. Since this paper is aiming to pre-
sent US military thinking on regional 
conflicts to a mostly non-military, 
academic audience, this chapter will 
extensively quote from the relevant 
official documents.  
In regard to terminology, which 
again is not always clear and without  
inconsistencies, “counterinsurgency” 
(COIN) should be considered an inte-
grated civil-military strategy against 
internal insurgencies. The official US 
military’s definition is: “Those mili-
tary, paramilitary, political, economic, 
psychological, and civic actions taken 
by a government to defeat insur-
gency” (US Department of Defense 
2001: 127). 
In contrast, “Counterguerrilla” 
is the component of COIN dealing 
militarily with opposing guerrilla 
forces. When US military forces 
abroad participate in the military side 
of counterinsurgency, especially 
counterguerrilla operations, this is 
generally called “Foreign Internal 
Defense” (FID). Complementing 
counterguerrilla operations is “Inter-
nal Defense and Development” 
(IDAD), which does include security 
and military aspects, but has an em-
phasis on political, economic and so-
cial aspects of counterinsurgency, and 
sometimes is used mostly in regard to 
the local government's policies. It 
should be noted that often the termi-
nology is used differently. For in-
stance, sometimes IDAD is used as a 
synonym to counterinsurgency.  
The US Army’s FMI 3-07.22 
(“Counterinsurgency Operations”) 
enumerates three aspects of counter-
insurgency: a) Civil-Military Opera-
tions (CMO), which in turn includes 
activities such as civil affairs, PSYOP 
(Psychological Operations), humani-
tarian assistance, support for civil 
administration, and military civic 
action across the range of military 
operations; b) combat operations 
(generally counterguerrilla opera-
tions, even if this term is not used); 
and c) Information Operations (IO) 
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(US Department of the Army 2004: 
VIII).  
5.1 Causes of Insurgencies 
from a Military Perspective 
The Marine Corps’ Field Man-
ual “Counterinsurgency Operations” 
(1980/2004) starts with a section on 
the characteristics of developing na-
tions, and with an analysis of the 
causes of insurgencies. On a general 
level of analyzing the political and 
socio-economic context of insurgen-
cies, the counterinsurgency manual 
summarizes: 
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“Each developing country is unique with its 
own history, culture, preferences, and goals 
which result in a combination of problems 
different from those which exist for any other 
nation. When the problems of one of these 
nations become so great that the accepted 
government can no longer cope with them, an 
unstable situation is created. [...] These eco-
nomic, social, and political factors are the basic 
causes of the problems which must be dealt with 
[Italics: J.H.]. We cannot hope to carry out 
successfully any mission which requires the 
establishment or reestablishment of law and 
order within a nation without a proper un-
derstanding of the characteristics which make 
that nation unique” (US Marine Corps 1980: 
8). 
It is worth quoting at length 
from the paragraphs on the reasons 
for internal unrest, violence and in-
surgencies: 
“Insurgency is a product of unsatisfactory 
conditions, social change, and a broad belief 
in the prospects for improvement. Character-
istically, the aspirations of the people are not 
being met by the government or ruling elite 
and there is an organized effort to discredit 
and/or dispossess the existing leadership. 
Conditions that encourage popular revolt are: 
(1) Social injustice. A demand for so-
cial justice by the mass of the peo-
ple is one of the most common fac-
tors leading to popular revolt. 
(2) Feudalism. 
(3) Poverty. 
(4) Disease. 
(5) Low productivity. 
(6) Unemployment. 
(7) Overpopulation. 
(8) Official corruption. 
(9) Ethnic or religious discrimination. 
(10) Unstable monetary system. 
(11) Illiteracy. 
(12) Government inefficiency. 
(13) Absentee ownership or inequities 
in the distribution of arable land. 
(14) Colonialism and foreign exploita-
tion also contribute to revolt, but 
are less common in the present pe-
riod” (ibid: 3). 
This list of causes for insur-
gency is quite remarkable in a mili-
tary manual, since it indicates an un-
derstanding that security and military 
problems are the result of internal 
economic, social and political factors. 
It implies that military responses to 
insurgency would not be addressing 
the root causes of conflict. The US Air 
Force (as does the US Army) per-
ceives the problem in similar terms: 
“The fundamental goal is to prevent insur-
gency. This is accomplished by defeating the 
threat insurgent organizations pose, and by 
correcting conditions that prompted the in-
surgency. Successful counterinsurgents realize 
that the true nature of the threat to the established 
government lies in the people’s perception of their 
government’s inability to solve problems. 
Counterinsurgency uses overt and covert 
methods in an integrated internal defense 
and development strategy. This strategy fo-
cuses on building viable political, economic, mili-
tary, and social institutions that respond in a 
timely manner to the needs of society.[Italics: 
J.H.]” (US Department for the Air Force 2000: 
13). 
The Marine Corps manual con-
curs by stressing key political con-
tributing aspects, such as “aggrava-
tion by the Government”, weakness of 
the Government, and exterior sup-
port. Among other factors it mentions 
social ills or grievances of the people, 
lack of funds, or excessive military 
burdens, or administrative weakness 
of the government and failure to 
maintain law and order (US Marine 
Corps 1980: 4 et sqq.) 
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The Marine Corps, with its long 
tradition in foreign intervention and 
counterinsurgency, obviously clearly 
understands the key socio-economic 
causes of political violence, and also 
the crucial role governments play in 
aggravating the situation because of 
their incompetence, weakness, repres-
sion or misguided policies. 
These factors are discussed to-
day by academic researchers under 
the headings of “governance”, “weak 
government” or “failing states”. The 
US Army’s counterinsurgency interim 
manual has a slightly different ap-
proach, stating: 
“These causes can range from the desire for 
greater equity in the distribution of resources 
(poverty alone is rarely, if ever, sufficient to 
sustain an insurgency) to a demand that for-
eign occupation end. Increasingly, religious 
ideology has become a catalyst for insurgent 
movements” (US Department of the Army 
2004: 1-3). 
It is obvious that the experience 
in the Middle East in general and par-
ticularly in Afghanistan and Iraq have 
contributed towards shaping this per-
ception.  
The counterguerrilla manual 
takes up these arguments and links 
them to the questions of ethnicity, 
religion and the policies of a guerrilla 
movement. 
“The more fragmented a society is, the 
greater the opportunity for dissatisfaction 
among the populace. The guerrilla will at-
tempt to increase friction between different 
groups in society. These groups may be 
aligned along racial, ethnic, religious, or so-
cial lines. Language differences or tradition 
may also be a reason for alignment. Religious 
influences may play a significant role in the 
sociological factors that affect the guerrilla. 
[… ] The guerrilla seeks to exploit this situa-
tion through the use of psychological opera-
tions” (US Marine Corps 1986: 2-3). 
According to the analysis of the 
counterinsurgency manual, the socio-
economic and political factors leading 
to an insurgency are most important, 
but are not sufficient to cause it.  
Army Field Manual 3-07 hardly 
deals with causes of insurgencies at 
all, and does so in somewhat vague 
and general terms where it does, 
while the “Counterguerrilla Opera-
tions” manual (FM 90-8), because of 
its narrower and more militarily ori-
ented focus, deals with these ques-
tions in a more general and superficial 
way. It is not contradicting the MC 
Counterinsurgency doctrine, but 
rarely mentions the causes for insur-
gencies. A few sections deal with 
these questions: 
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“There are three requirements that must exist 
before an insurgency can occur. 
a.  Vulnerable population. For whatever 
the reasons – social, political, or eco-
nomic – the population is generally 
open to change. The insurgents will 
offer hope for change and exploit dis-
satisfaction with the current govern-
ment.  
b.  Leadership available for direction. A 
vulnerable population alone will not 
support an insurgent movement. 
There must be a leadership element 
that can direct the frustrations of a 
dissatisfied populace along the lines 
delineated by the overall insurgent 
strategy. 
41
c.  Lack of government control. Lack of 
government control may be real or 
perceived. The greater the control the 
government has over the situation, 
the less likely are the chances for in-
surgent success. The opposite is also 
true: the less control the government 
has, the greater is the chance for in-
surgent success” (ibid section 1-4: 1-
2). 
While this manual mentions a 
“dissatisfied populace” and social, 
political, or economic reasons, it does 
not elaborate. Also, it briefly touches 
upon questions of governance, but 
only in the context of government 
control, not in regard to policies or 
polity. The reasons for these different 
approaches are obvious: the counter-
insurgency doctrine conceptualizes 
the overall problems of dealing with 
insurgencies, while the counterguer-
rilla manual deals with military 
means to react to it. But even from a 
purely military perspective a military 
approach is not enough, as the coun-
terguerrilla manual makes quite clear: 
“Political considerations influence the con-
duct of counterguerrilla operations. It is es-
sentially a contest between the host govern-
ment and guerrillas concerning political, so-
cial, religious, or economic issues. The gov-
ernment and its representatives must present 
themselves and their program as the better 
choice” (ibid: 3-5/3-6). 
Field Manual FM 3-07 (pub-
lished in 2003) takes up this point: 
“Success in counterinsurgency goes to the 
party that achieves the greater popular sup-
port. The winner will be the party that better 
forms the issues, mobilizes groups and forces 
around them, and develops programs that 
solve problems of relative deprivation. This 
requires political, social, and economic devel-
opment” (US Department of the Army 2003: 
3-4). 
The result of this for the mili-
tary side of operations is presented in 
quite unambiguous terms: 
“No matter how successful FID forces are 
militarily, the insurgency is not defeated until 
the political, economic, and social problems 
which led to it are corrected or significantly 
alleviated. This usually takes a considerable 
length of time” (US Marine Corps 1986: 3-5). 
Again, this is not from a social 
science textbook, but states what the 
US Marine Corps deems important 
preconditions for military success. 
5.2 Characteristics and 
Development of 
Insurgencies 
The next step in both manuals 
is to describe and analyze the charac-
ter of insurgencies.19 It is interesting 
to note that the nature of insurgencies 
is hardly linked to the previous analy-
sis of its causes, but transferred into a 
different context. Both manuals treat 
insurgencies primarily as “commu-
nist” in character, despite a short dis-
claimer “not to imply” that “all rebel-
lions or attempts to overthrow estab-
lished governments are inspired by 
communists” (US Marine Corps 1980: 
9).  
Still, further on both texts gen-
erally treat insurgencies as communist 
and stress the importance of “external 
support”. It is obvious that the Cold 
                                                     
19  For a general analysis of post Cold War 
insurgencies see: Metz 1993; for a recent over-
view of past, current and future insurgencies 
see: Beckett 2005: 22-36. 
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War context has left a strong mark 
here. The US Army manuals FM 3-07 
and FMI 3-07.22, which were com-
pletely written after the end of the 
Cold War and published only in 2003 
and 2004, do not mention a wholesale 
“communist” character of insurgen-
cies. Instead, they emphasize the role 
of local elites: 
42 “Insurgencies are dynamic political move-ments, resulting from real or perceived griev-
ance or neglect that leads to alienation from 
an established government. Alienated elite 
members advance alternatives to existing 
conditions. (Culture defines elites. For exam-
ple, in most of the world educators and 
teachers are members of the elite; in Islamic 
and many Catholic nations, religious leaders 
are elite members)” (US Department of the 
Army 2004: 1-7). 
Both Marine Corps manuals 
analyze insurgencies in three stages: 
the first phase is termed “passive 
stage (Strategic Defense Stage)” by the 
counterinsurgency manual, while 
given the name of “latent and incipi-
ent insurgency” by the counterguer-
rilla manual. The second phase is 
named “Active Stage (Strategic Stale-
mate Stage)” and “Guerrilla Warfare” 
respectively, and the third one “Coun-
teroffensive Stage” and “War of 
Movement” respectively in the two 
manuals. While the first manual is 
more detailed in regard to describing 
these stages, the texts do not differ in 
substance. Interestingly, this categori-
zation of insurgencies in three stages 
is still a reflection of the Maoist strat-
egy of “People’s War” – which in the 
Post-Cold War era often does not 
make much sense. It is of little sur-
prise that some military thinkers have 
criticized this outmoded conceptuali-
zation of an insurgency, e.g. Mont-
gomery McFate (Mc Fate 2005: 27) 
and Steven Metz/Raymond Millen 
(Metz and Millen 2004: 16). US Army 
Field Manual 3-07 moves beyond this 
outdated model and puts forward a 5-
stage model of insurgency develop-
ment, which includes preinsurgency, 
organization, guerilla warfare, con-
ventional warfare and postinsurgency 
as distinct phases (US Department of 
the Army 2003: D-5 and D-6). 
While this still is a somewhat 
mechanical understanding of the 
process, supposedly culminating in a 
conventional warfare stage and not 
completely breaking with the tradi-
tional model, this at least to some de-
gree attempts to take recent experi-
ences into account.  
Both manuals agree on the ba-
sic starting point of counterinsur-
gency/counterguerrilla campaigns. 
This cannot be a military approach of 
directly beating the insurgents, since 
they will hardly ever operate in big 
formations, and it would not address 
the root causes of the insurgency. The 
strategy can also not be to conquer 
and hold territory, because this would 
not defeat the insurgents but might 
even provide them with additional 
targets for ambushes and attacks. In-
stead, both manuals clarify that the 
loyalty and control of the population 
is the strategically most important 
point. 
5.3 Core Strategies for Counter-
insurgency 
Metz and Millen of the Strate-
gic Studies Institute of the US Army 
War College, who have contributed 
important studies to our topic, name a 
key factor in counterinsurgency strat-
egy: 
“Insurgents require popular or coerced sup-
port from the people; conversely, a prerequi-
site to counterinsurgency success is the separa-
tion of the dissidents from the populace. [Italics: 
J.H.] The separation may be accomplished by 
physical or psychological means or a combi-
nation of both depending on the circum-
stances. Regardless of means, the target is al-
ways the same – the people” (Metz and Mil-
len 2004: 54). 
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The counterguerrilla manual 
puts this point even more strongly: 
“The government must isolate the insurgent 
from the population, both physically and 
psychologically, thereby denying him per-
sonnel, material, and intelligence support” 
(US Marine Corps 1986: 1-5). 
and the US Army fully agrees with 
this approach: 
43“In a counterinsurgency, the center of gravity is public support. In order to defeat an insur-
gent force, US forces must be able to separate 
insurgents from the population” (Department 
of the Army Counterinsurgency Operations 
FMI 3-07.22 2004: 2-13). 
FMI 3-07.22 states, “this is analo-
gous to separating the fish from 
the sea.” (ibid: 1-10). In extreme 
cases the separation of insurgents 
from the population can also be 
organized by resettling the latter 
(ibid: 3-4). 
Robert Tomes, recently writ-
ing in Parameters (the Journal of the 
US Army War College) provides some 
suggestions on how this is to be 
achieved: 
“For example, campaign planning should in-
clude a system to account for every citizen, 
coordination with the political effort to des-
ignate a hierarchical network of groups 
headed by pro-government chiefs, and a sys-
tem to monitor the activities of guerrilla sym-
pathizers. This entails a census, the issuing of 
photo-identification cards, and a countrywide 
intelligence system. The ultimate goal is to 
separate the fish from the sea, leaving it ex-
posed to the state’s spear” (Tomes 2004: 19). 
Starting from this need to win 
over the population and separate it 
from the insurgent forces it again fol-
lows that military operations are only 
a part of counterinsurgency. The 
population-centered approach has 
several dimensions:  
• as quoted, it aims to cut off the 
sources of material and logistical 
support from the insurgents;  
• it aims at receiving intelligence 
on the insurgency from sectors of 
the population; 
• it attempts to isolate the insur-
gents geographically to be better 
able to apply fire power and 
other military means against 
them; 
• it has the aim of antagonizing the 
population and insurgents 
against each other and thereby 
the insurgency politically; 
• and it has the aim of addressing 
some of the causes and justifi-
cations of the insurgency, to 
give the population “hope” in 
the future and incentives to co-
operate. 
These are the strategic points in 
counterinsurgency, while military and 
non-military tools just contribute to 
these goals. Therefore, the elements of 
political, social and economic reforms 
also have a subservient role, meant to 
create good-will among the popula-
tion 20 This has been called “winning 
the hearts and minds” of people, time 
and again. 
“Winning the willing support of the popula-
tion to the side of the threatened government 
is one of the principal goals of countering an 
insurgent situation. There is not a more cer-
tain method of eliminating the guerrilla and 
the infrastructure than by turning the civil-
ians against them. The insurgent has em-
ployed tactics designed to create doubts, bit-
terness, grievances, and unrest in the popu-
lace toward their government. He has been 
changing and modifying the attitudes of the 
civilian about his government in an effort to 
establish a suitable environment for guerrilla 
                                                     
20  “Although the basic objective of internal 
development is to contribute to internal inde-
pendence and freedom from conditions foster-
ing insurgency, its immediate practical goal is 
gaining population support. Economic, politi-
cal, and social development programs are 
aimed at establishing rapport between the 
people and the government which will result in 
support of the government to the detriment of 
the insurgency” (US Marine Corps: 1980: 27). 
 
Jochen Hippler 
 
growth. The government must counter by 
establishing new faith and loyalty, and per-
suading the people to back their own gov-
ernment against the insurgents. The words 
and actions of all representatives of the gov-
ernment, whether they are members of civil 
agencies, of the host country's armed forces, 
or US Marines, must be complimentary and 
directed toward winning the people” (ibid: 
134). 
As we have seen, the combat 
role of the military conceptually is 
supposed to be complementary, pro-
tective and conducive to political, 
social and economic development. 
Interestingly, socio-political develop-
ment is not presented as the core ob-
jective of counterinsurgency, but as a 
means to another end: to influence the 
perceptions of the civilian population. 
At the center of the strategy therefore 
are political-psychological goals – 
changing the thinking and feeling of 
the people in a target area. Both the 
developmental reform process and 
military combat are insufficient by 
themselves, but are designed to facili-
tate changes in the political percep-
tions – and therefore the behavior – of 
the population. The relationships be-
tween these factors are complex: 
without development and reform 
military operations can hardly suc-
ceed strategically – but without suc-
cessful military operations providing 
security some basic preconditions for 
successful development and reform in 
a counterinsurgency context are lack-
ing. 
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5.4 Civil-Military Relations, 
Development Policy, and 
Nation-Building as Tools of 
Counterinsurgency 
As we have seen, in the context 
of winning over the population US 
military analysts often stress that 
“balanced development of the 
county” – in the sense of political, 
social and economic development – is 
an instrument to reduce the causes of 
conflict, but mostly to influence the 
perceptions and loyalty of the people. 
To a big degree this is the function of 
the development agencies and other 
civilian agencies of the host country 
and its external supporters. Therefore 
civil-military cooperation with local 
and international government au-
thorities, international development 
and relief organizations and with 
non-governmental organizations are 
key. At the same time, military units 
also directly contribute to this goal, in 
the form of “civic action”, conducting 
“civil affairs” (CA).  
The US Army gives these ex-
amples of civilian functions in coun-
terinsurgency operations: 
“Establishing conditions favorable for the de-
velopment of HN [host nation: J.H.] govern-
mental institutions consistent with US objec-
tives. These conditions include the establish-
ment of law enforcement and freely elected 
political leaders where possible, public in-
formation, health care, schools, public works, 
and fire fighting capabilities” (US Depart-
ment of the Army 2004: 2-2). 
This again indicates the politi-
cal character of counterinsurgency, 
especially its focus on the local state. 
US Army Field Manual FM 7-98, Op-
erations in a Low-Intensity Conflict 
(1992), which is to provide guidance 
to military commanders at the brigade 
and battalion level, names as func-
tions of Civil Affairs Operations (CA) 
“assisting a host government to meet 
its peoples needs”, “establishing a 
temporary civil administration to 
maintain law and order” and “estab-
lishing a civil administration in occu-
pied enemy territory”. (US Depart-
ment of the Army 1992: Chapter 7 
section VIII point 7.31 (b) no page) 
It is clear that not just the coun-
terinsurgency campaign as a whole, 
but also battalions and brigades are 
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supposed to strengthen, restore or 
even establish functions and organiza-
tional structures of government in a 
host country. “Establishing a civil 
administration” either at the invita-
tion of a weak host government or as 
part of an occupation is easily recog-
nizable as part of state-building. 
Therefore it is not surprising that 
there is a strong connection between 
counterinsurgency and Nation-
Building in general.21 Field Manual 
Interim 3-07.22 (“Counterinsurgency 
Operations”, 2004) is quite explicit on 
this point: 
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“To the extent the HN [host nation: J.H.] is 
lacking basic institutions and functions, the 
burden upon the US and multinational 
forces is increased. In the extreme, rather 
than building upon what is, the US and 
other nations will find themselves creating 
elements (such as local forces and govern-
ment institutions) of the society they have 
been sent to assist. Military forces thus be-
come involved in nation building while simul-
taneously attempting to defeat an insurgency. 
[Italics: J.H.] US forces often lead because 
the US military can quickly project and sus-
tain a force. This involves them in a host of 
current activities regarded as nonstandard, 
from supervising elections to restoring 
power and facilitating and conducting 
schooling” (US Department of the Army 
2004: 1-10). 
The Army also explains that Coun-
terinsurgency “often involve(s) na-
tion building. Counterinsurgency 
often involves nation building, but 
not all nation building involves 
counterinsurgency” (ibid: 2-2). 
This also implies the close coordi-
nation with other US government 
agencies, e.g. USAID: 
“USAID is the US government agency re-
sponsible for nation building. USAID ac-
tivities are coordinated through the US em-
bassy. At the tactical level, direct coordina-
tion through the chain of command with 
USAID avoids duplication of effort and en-
                                                     
21  For Nation-Building in general see: 
Hippler 2005b. 
sures adequate resources and technical as-
sistance are made available” (ibid.: 3-2). 
Indeed, many activities in 
counterinsurgency have a direct link 
to nation-building. Sometimes the 
provision of services to civilians, 
which under normal conditions 
would be the task of civilian govern-
ment agencies, is a part of this. Also, 
the guarantee of basic security for the 
state itself and for the population 
should be considered in this context. 
But civic action and development 
activities in the economic and political 
fields belong particularly to this cate-
gory. It has been mentioned before 
that often a big part of counterinsur-
gency consist of trying to make state 
and government structures opera-
tional or even to establish them. This 
is the core of any nation-building en-
terprise. In this context the army 
holds the view that “(n)ormally, 
NGOs, private foreign corporations, 
HN [host nation: J.H.] private enter-
prises, and US governmental activities 
cooperate in local counterinsurgency 
programs” (ibid: 3-2). 
It is a significant aspect of coun-
terinsurgencies that NGOs and busi-
nesses are a part of the campaign, 
even if often without knowing or 
without their consent. Therefore it is 
important for private actors to know 
about and reflect upon their role in 
this context, if they do not want to 
become an unwilling tool in a military 
strategy. The same applies to civilian 
development agencies, which obvi-
ously can be closely linked in sub-
stance and often in organization to 
counterinsurgency. 
The COIN manual summarizes 
the “military functions” to be 
achieved by internal and external 
armed forces. As a primary function 
the US Marine Corps forces are sup-
posed to “restore law and order and 
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reestablish security in coordination 
with the host country”. In an ancillary 
function they are supposed to “pro-
mote, in coordination with the civil 
agencies of the host country and the 
foreign service departments of our 
own government, the political, social, 
and economic welfare of the host 
country” (US Marine Corps 1980: 39). 
46 This is an important point, which will open up more questions 
later on: here, the root causes of in-
surgencies, as developed before in 
many of the documents quoted, 
namely the social, economic and po-
litical deficits of a country, are rele-
gated to a secondary, “ancillary func-
tion” in counterinsurgency, compared 
to the “primary function” of restoring 
security. Also, US Army Field Manual 
FM 7-98 (“Operations in a Low-
Intensity Conflict”, providing guid-
ance for battalions and brigades) 
deemphasizes political and Civic Ac-
tion operations in some parts of its 
sections on counterinsurgency. 
To illustrate the non-military 
elements of these military campaigns 
it may be illuminating to show how 
the Marine Corps is expected to deal 
with social development. The manual 
summarizes this point by specifically 
mentioning the areas of health, educa-
tion, urbanization, population, leader-
ship, status, citizen groups, land re-
forms, and housing. The reason for 
these activities is “to instill a personal 
sense of participation in a larger local 
and national effort” (ibid: 30). 
It is easy to see that these and 
other civic action operations by a mili-
tary force might be of practical use by 
themselves and might help improve 
the living conditions of people, espe-
cially in remote and underdeveloped 
areas. And it is also quite obvious that 
these kinds of activities, when linked 
to psychological operations (PSYOP) 
and public affairs (PA), can be a pow-
erful tool of propaganda and help 
create legitimacy (see Lord and Bar-
nett 1989).  
But we should note here the 
justification for these kinds of activi-
ties: it is generally creating “hope” for 
the population, not structural change, 
which implies an instrumental charac-
ter to achieve psychological effects. 
Focusing public attention away 
from the bloody operations on the 
battlefield and toward support for 
health clinics and orphanages can be 
very useful to avoid criticism and 
build good-will. Getting local and 
international newspapers or TV sta-
tions to report about development or 
social activities instead of the repres-
sive side of a counterinsurgency cam-
paign will help make this campaign 
effective.  
US Army Field Manual FM 46-1 
(“Public Affairs Operations”) explains 
it in this way: 
“Information is a major element in these op-
erations. Support for the mission and percep-
tions of its legitimacy are greatly affected by 
making information available to participants, 
observers, supporting nations and the inter-
national community. 
This is best achieved through coordinated 
information operations. Public affairs, civil 
affairs and psychological operations use dis-
tinct methods and address distinct audiences, 
but must all be coordinated to ensure com-
mon credibility. [...] Missions of both catego-
ries, assistance and peace operations, are me-
dia intensive. This media attention, rather 
than being viewed as a hindrance, is in fact 
an asset. Media reports are often considered 
more credible than official pronouncements. 
They are a primary conduit for communicating 
Army goals, capabilities and accomplishments. 
Media reports contribute to perceptions of legiti-
macy, [Italics: J.H.] requiring the presentation 
of consistent, clear messages about the opera-
tion” (US Department of the Army 1997a:40). 
We can appreciate that media 
reporting in conflict can be an instru-
ment of public scrutiny and control in 
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regard to foreign and security policy, 
but it also is in danger of being in-
strumentalized to justify military 
campaigns. This potential has been 
recognized by the US forces especially 
since media reporting played an im-
portant role in delegitimizing the war 
in Vietnam. Since then US forces have 
paid special attention to arranging 
media coverage, right up to the intro-
duction of “embedded journalists” in 
the Iraq war. 
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5.5 The Role of Military 
Combat and the Goals of 
the Strategy 
Finally we must look briefly at 
the military and combat roles of the 
US armed forces in counterinsurgency 
campaigns. The fact that counterin-
surgency is strategically focused on 
political control and restoration of 
popular loyalty towards the local 
government does not imply that force, 
violence, and combat do not play an 
important role. But combat operations 
only make sense in close cooperation 
with the other elements of counterin-
surgency. In the words of the US 
Army’s counterinsurgency manual: 
“The primary objective of counterinsurgency 
operations is to neutralize the insurgents and, 
together with population and resource con-
trol measures, establish a secure environment 
within which political, social, and economic 
progress is possible” (US Department of the 
Army 2004: 3-8).22
Generally, therefore, the strat-
egy is not to directly confront the in-
surgent force head-on and destroy it. 
Whenever this might be possible US 
armed forces would obviously try to 
use such an opportunity, but any 
competent guerrilla or insurgent force 
                                                     
22  Interestingly, this quote mentions security 
and the use of force as preconditions for devel-
opment, not vice versa.  
will make sure that it does not arise. 
A mature guerrilla force will only 
fight on its own terms and generally 
avoid operating in larger formations. 
FM 3-07, while in some regards di-
verting from this understanding itself, 
puts the core role of military forces in 
counterinsurgency like this: 
“The regular armed forces are 
the shield behind which political, so-
cial, and economic development oc-
curs” (US Department of the Army 
2003: 3-6). This again clarifies that 
winning the war militarily is not per-
ceived as feasible in counterinsur-
gency, but that the armed forces are 
operating in a role subservient to po-
litical and economic reform – in prin-
ciple at least, because this is often 
disregarded on the ground. 
Therefore, combat operations 
are supposed to serve several pur-
poses: 
• attacking and whenever possible 
directly destroying insurgent 
formations; 
• harassment of insurgents to keep 
them off balance and reduce their 
chances of taking the initiative; 
• defending cities, military installa-
tions and other important assets; 
• providing security and protect-
ing projects and programs that 
are politically or economically 
relevant to the stabilization of the 
respective country. 
The last point generally is the 
decisive one, while the other three are 
to some degree contributing elements 
or preconditions. The military prob-
lem has three aspects. One, military 
operations in counterinsurgency op-
erations are quite different from con-
ventional ones, because firepower is 
much less important and combat is 
not primarily aimed at conquering or 
holding territory, but at small or mid-
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sized groups of hostile fighters, which 
are difficult to identify and to distin-
guish from civilians. Two, while the 
insurgents can select targets at will 
and their attacks can hardly be pre-
dicted, the local and US armed forces 
have a much more complex task: to 
protect all of the potential targets si-
multaneously, and also to protect 
political processes, not just military or 
other installations. Three, combat op-
erations in counterinsurgency often 
have to be conducted in the context of 
political restrictions. They have to 
serve, not undermine or dominate the 
political aspects of counterinsurgency. 
Therefore, the rules of engagement 
have to be more restrictive than in 
conventional operations, e.g. in re-
gard to firepower or targeting (“col-
lateral damage” might undermine 
population loyalty or international 
cooperation).23
In summary, the core strategy 
of modern US counterinsurgency is 
an approach of overcoming a politi-
cal-military threat from a non-
conventional enemy by using mili-
tary, police, intelligence, economic, 
political and developmental tools in 
an integrated way. Since often a fully 
developed insurgency cannot be de-
feated by military means, the strategy 
mostly is political, while making 
heavy use of military instruments in a 
supporting role.  
Metz and Millen argued: 
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“Because insurgents attempt to prevent the 
military battlespace from becoming decisive 
and concentrate in the political and psycho-
logical, operational design must be different 
than for conventional combat. One useful ap-
proach would be to adopt an interagency, ef-
fects-based method of counterinsurgency 
planning focused on the following key activi-
ties: 
                                                     
23  Some officers have complained about too 
narrowly defined Rules of Engagement. See 
Broadstone 1996. 
• Fracturing the insurgent movement 
through military, psychological, and 
political means, to include direct 
strikes, dividing one part against an-
other, offering amnesties, draining 
the pool of alienated, disillusioned, 
angry young males by providing al-
ternatives, and so forth. …;  
• Delegitimizing the insurgent move-
ment in the eyes of the local popula-
tion and any international constitu-
ency it might have; 
• Demoralizing the insurgent movement 
by creating and sustaining the per-
ception that long-term trends are ad-
verse and by making the lives of in-
surgents unpleasant and dangerous 
through military pressure and psy-
chological operations;  
• Delinking the insurgent movement 
from its internal and external support 
by understanding and destroying the 
political, logistics, and financial con-
nections; and, 
• Deresourcing the insurgent movement 
both by curtailing funding streams 
and causing it to waste existing re-
sources” (Metz/Millen 2004: 25 et 
sqq.). 
Nevertheless, two things 
should be kept in mind. One, there 
are many officers who would not 
agree with this approach and prefer to 
stay with more conventional means 
(like maximizing firepower, relying 
on air superiority, etc.), because they 
think it is the job of a soldier to fight 
and win wars, and not to get mixed 
up in “social engineering” or nation-
building. Many officers are also less 
than enthusiastic about the restric-
tions which the political considera-
tions often have on the way they can 
conduct combat operations. They (or 
some of them) might not necessarily 
disagree with the political tasks, but 
would very much prefer them to be 
handled by civilian agencies. And 
two, even if the general approach now 
has the blessing of the military brass – 
though not always of enthusiastic 
character – this does not mean it is 
always implemented. Unforeseen 
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conditions, conventional thinking, 
lack of preparation, misunderstand-
ing a specific conflict or the internal 
condition of the respective country or 
political restrictions may contribute to 
not seriously implementing the strat-
egy.  
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6. Analysis and Critique: Counterinsurgency 
in the Context of LIC, MOOTW and 
Stability Operations 
The main purpose of this paper 
was to familiarize the academic and 
interested general public with the 
thinking and strategizing of US mili-
tary forces in regard to regional con-
flicts and how to deal with them. 
Counterinsurgency was our main 
focus, because it is the most important 
and most frequent kind of operation 
in this regard. Up to now we have 
generally restricted ourselves to pre-
senting, summarizing and highlight-
ing key points of the strategies. In this 
chapter it is in order to briefly analyse 
and critically assess a few crucial 
points which have been touched upon 
before. The first sub-chapter will dis-
cuss a few quite specific points of 
criticism coming from military ana-
lysts. Thereafter we will move on to 
more general analysis.  
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6.1 Dissenting Military Voices 
Military brass and analysts 
have not infrequently raised points of 
objections in regard to LIC, MOOTW, 
Stability Operations and counterin-
surgency. Some of them did so from a 
more conventional military perspec-
tive, trying to restrict the soldier’s role 
to war fighting. Others have appreci-
ated the importance of integrating 
political, social and economic tools 
into counterinsurgency and related 
operations, and have instead criti-
cized the apparent deficits in actually 
doing so. This perspective gained 
strength after the experiences of the 
US forces in Afghanistan and Iraq  
demonstrated impressive weaknesses 
in dealing with post-war situations 
and Stability Operations, especially in 
the field of civilian reconstruction and 
counterinsurgency. Lt.Col Patrick 
Donahue, for instance, raised an im-
portant point of criticism in the Mili-
tary Review: 
“In Iraq and elsewhere, the Army asks bat-
talion and company combat commanders to 
conduct nationbuilding and act as civil af-
fairs officers. Soldiers must master war-
fighting skills to seize and secure terrain 
and towns while working peacefully with 
the local populace and, hopefully, persuad-
ing them that nonviolence is the best path 
to stability. Failing to win the hearts and 
minds of local people might not sound a 
mission’s death knell, but it makes success 
in suppressing insurgencies and terrorism 
more difficult.” Donahue pointedly asks: 
“What is the Army doing to prepare leaders 
for these undertakings?” (Donahue 2004: 
24). 
Asking this question obviously 
implies that the US Army is not doing 
enough, which after more than 20 
years of LIC/MOOTW doctrine devel-
opment and the invasions of Afghani-
stan and Iraq is quite an important 
criticism. And this neglect is not just 
reflected in a lack of training, but also 
of emphasis on these key points in 
MOOTW doctrine. One of the exam-
ples Donahue gives draws on a lesson 
learnt from Iraq, which had contrib-
uted a great deal to create the mess 
US forces got themselves (and Iraq) 
into after the war:24
                                                     
24  For this author’s perspective on the post-
war situation in Iraq: Hippler 2005a: 194-200; 
also: Hippler 2005b: 81-97. 
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“Knowing how to run a city is essential to 
establishing safety and stability in an urban 
environment. The most pressing problems 
Army troops initially faced in Iraq were the 
reestablishment of electric power, and pro-
viding clean water and health care services. 
Soldiers must understand the basic functions 
of city administration and how to organize 
public works departments to maintain, fix, 
and if necessary, establish basic city services. 
The vitality of the local economy and the abil-
ity of citizens to buy, sell, and transport 
goods are essential for a return to normalcy. 
Freely exchanging goods and services and 
distributing food (outside of emergency gov-
ernmental aid) are critical to security” (ibid: 
26). 
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This point is well put and refers 
to the incompetence and neglect in 
dealing with the specific Iraqi post-
war situation as well as to MOOTW 
doctrine, which mentions the crucial 
need for such civilian activities in 
general, but does not seriously deal 
with them in detail.  
Staff Sergeant George Ander-
son is even more critical, drawing on 
his experiences in the Balkans. He 
insists on the importance of Nation-
Building for stabilizing target coun-
tries and presents his suggestions:  
“Unlike current civil affairs units that provide 
technical expertise, future nationbuilders 
would assist and provide governance. Sol-
diers need to know how to destroy targets. 
Nationbuilders need to know how to create 
good impressions and build formidable rela-
tionships. They are one part diplomat and 
one part soldier. [...] We want our nation-
builders to be open, approachable, and easy 
to communicate with. We want nationbuild-
ers who understand and care about the locals. 
We want nationbuilders to dialogue first and 
rely on force only as a last resort” (Anderson 
III 2004: 50). 
Again, this does not contradict 
MOOTW and related doctrines in 
principle, but is a strong criticism of 
their failing of not moving from gen-
eral principles to specific conceptuali-
zation and implementation. Anderson 
stresses the importance of learning 
these lessons: “History is full of ex-
amples of countries that have won the 
conventional war, but lost the nation-
building war. In Vietnam, we learned 
that you do not win a person’s heart 
and mind by kicking him in the butt. 
Unfortunately, we have yet to learn 
the most efficient way to win hearts 
and minds” (ibid). 
His radical suggestion is to cre-
ate specific military units to deal with 
governance and Nation-Building and 
keep them apart from combat units. 
“Attempting to have the same people 
in the same uniforms perform both 
roles confuses those around us as well 
as ourselves” (ibid). 
An important critic of recent US 
military policies is Gen. (ret.) An-
thony Zinni, formerly commander of 
the US Central Command (which is 
responsible for the Middle East). 
Zinni had voiced a ringing attack on 
some basic points of US military poli-
cies and practices, which lead directly 
to MOOTW and COIN conceptualiza-
tion and implementation. It is worth 
quoting at length from the transcript 
of a speech of Gen. Zinni, delivered to 
the US Marine Corps Association and 
the US Naval Institute in 2003. 
“Right now, in a place like Iraq, you're deal-
ing with the Jihads [sic; probably “Jihadists”: 
J.H.] that are coming in to raise hell, crime on 
the streets that's rampant, ex-Ba'athists that 
are still running around, and the potential 
now for this country to fragment: … It's a 
powder keg. … Resources are needed, a strat-
egy is needed, a plan. This is a different kind 
of conflict. War fighting is just one element of 
it. … How do we cope with that? On one 
hand, you have to shoot and kill somebody; 
on the other hand, you have to feed some-
body. […] (Y)ou have to build an economy, 
restructure the infrastructure, build the po-
litical system. And there's some poor lieuten-
ant colonel, colonel, brigadier general down 
there, stuck in some province with all that 
saddled onto him, with NGOs [nongovern-
mental organizations] and political wannabes 
running around, with factions and a culture 
he doesn't understand. […] The military does 
a damn good job of killing people and break-
ing things. … What is the role of the military 
beyond that point? [... W]hat we have to ask 
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ourselves now is, is there something that the 
military needs to change into that involves its 
movement into this area of the political, the 
economic, the information management? If 
the others, those wearing suits, can't come in 
and solve the problem – can't bring the re-
sources, the expertise, and the organization – 
and we're going to continue to get stuck with 
it, you have one or two choices.”  
Zinni demands that either civil-
ian agencies get the competence and 
resources to get the job done, or the 
armed forces tackle these tasks seri-
ously. 
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“What could this mean? It could mean civil 
affairs changes from just being a tactical or-
ganization doing basic humanitarian care and 
interaction with the civilian population, to 
actually being capable of reconstructing na-
tions. That we will have people in uniform 
that are educated in the disciplines of eco-
nomics, political structure, and we're actually 
going to go in and do that. We're actually go-
ing to be the governors. The CINCs [Com-
manders in Chief: J.H.] that are the procon-
suls will truly be proconsuls and given that 
authority to do it; that you will set regional 
policy. This is scary stuff. … But either get the 
people on the scene that can do it, get them 
there when they need to be there, give them 
the resources and the training, create the in-
teroperability that's necessary – or validate 
the military mission to do it. In my mind, 
that's the most important question we have 
now” (Zinni 2003: no page). 
It is clear that from the perspec-
tive of General Zinni and others the 
crucial point of LIC and MOOTW 
doctrine, that is solving specific politi-
cal, social and economic problems, 
including reconstructing the basic 
mechanisms of governance in post-
war situations and, especially under 
conditions of occupation, achieving 
stability and serving the US national 
interest, is not being implemented 
properly. There is a lack of planning, 
competence, resources and man-
power. And Zinni’s conclusion is that 
if the civilian agencies are not doing 
this, the only other option is that the 
armed forces should do it themselves 
– which would imply the authority 
and the competence to get it done. 
And, according to Zinni, both are 
lacking, no matter what LIC and 
MOOTW doctrine demands in ab-
stract terms. 
6.2 One Strategy for All 
Contexts? – The 
Relationship of Ideology 
and Concepts 
After following doctrine devel-
opment from the 1940s up to the pre-
sent, one aspect is striking. The period 
we covered has been characterized by 
quite different macro-political con-
texts. First, from the Banana Wars to 
World War II, US military interven-
tion into local and regional conflicts 
was characterized by uninhibited and 
generally non-ideological imperial-
ism. What was used for legitimizing 
and justifying Small Wars was basi-
cally pragmatic (like protecting US 
citizens and property, enforcing bilat-
eral contracts with other countries, 
enforcing re-payment of debt, or re-
storing order) and supported by a 
strong sense of cultural, national and 
ethnic (WASP) self-confidence. To 
give a brief example of this early 
thinking we may quote US Marine 
Corps Major H.E. Ellis, from an article 
published in the Marine Corps Gazette 
in March of 1921: 
“Among the progressive and altruistic mem-
bers of the Community of Nations Uncle Sam 
undoubtedly stands preeminent in every 
“New Movement”; whether it be national or 
international, he is always to be found dis-
tinctly at the front. “Clean-up” weeks are his 
speciality and he will “clean up” anything or 
any place – a disease or a nation. Now this work of 
creating order out of chaos and showing small na-
tions the way they should go is justly considered 
to be accomplished to the satisfaction of everybody 
[Italics: J.H.] if it were not for the particular 
attitude of the American people themselves” 
(Ellis 1921: 1). 
The mixing of pragmaticism 
and a feeling of a US “manifest des-
tiny” of “showing small nations the 
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way they should go” was not fed by 
ideological confrontation against oth-
ers but by a simple sense of self-
centeredness. Major Ellis remarked:  
“In so far as the Marines in general are con-
cerned, they believe that in every case where 
the United States has taken charge of a small 
state it has been actuated by purely altruistic 
motives. … The particular motives for the in-
terference in another nation’s affairs are 
many and varied. The action may be taken for 
the protection of lives and property of our 
own or foreign citizens, the establishment of a 
stable government in order that international 
obligations may be respected, the general dis-
ciplining and education of a state for its debut 
into the society of nations, or for any other 
ethical reason with the Monroe Doctrine as a 
background” (ibid: 1-2). 
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“Yes, the Marines are down in jungleland, 
and they did kill a man in war, and a great 
many people did not know anything about it. 
This is most unfortunate, but – the Marines 
are only doing their job as ordered by the 
people of the United States” (ibid: 15). 
After World War II the US per-
ception of Small Wars and counterin-
surgency was necessarily deeply col-
oured by Cold War thinking. Anti-
Communism was the overwhelming 
ideology until the late 1980s, and gen-
erally the US role in local Third World 
conflict was conceptually integrated 
into it. Small Wars and Low-Intensity 
Conflicts of the 1980 were mostly seen 
as an element of East-West confronta-
tion and the fight against Commu-
nism. While self-centredness and a 
missionary moral impulse were still 
strong, both US self-perception and 
the counterinsurgency (or pro-
insurgency) strategies were basically 
legitimized and conceptualized as 
anti-communist, which means ideo-
logical, crusades. Later, for a few 
years during the second half of the 
1990s and at the very beginning of the 
new century, the US role in local con-
flicts was more diffuse: instead of the 
one “bear”, the World now seemed to 
be a dangerous place because of 
“many snakes”. For a short while the 
main justification for US military poli-
cies and intervention in the Third 
World instead of a specific enemy 
were instability, “international law” 
(Kuwait) and “humanitarian” and 
related concerns. Somalia and the 
Balkan wars were key examples. After 
September 11, 2001, the new justifica-
tion for US military Third World in-
tervention became the “War on Ter-
rorism” and the struggle against Mus-
lim extremism. The wars and Military 
Operations Other Than War (and 
counterinsurgency) in Afghanistan 
and Iraq – among many other areas of 
operation – were put in this context. A 
new global and ideological confronta-
tion has to a great degree taken the 
place of Cold War ideology. While 
there were some ideological links be-
tween these settings (like defending 
“American Values”, “freedom”, and 
“democracy” against alien ideologies 
like Communism or Muslim extrem-
ism), they are still quite different from 
each other.  
The important point here is that 
while US ideologies and legitimations 
for Third World military involvement 
and intervention have been extremely 
variable over the last 80 years, the 
strategies and concepts in regard to 
them have been remarkably stable. 
Military interventions have been un-
dertaken on a continuous basis for 
much more than a century, while their 
legitimations and ideologies have 
kept changing fundamentally. Also, 
the number of military interventions 
did not change with the changing 
ideological context. And, as this paper 
has demonstrated, the basic military 
approaches to intervening, fighting 
instability and insurgency and de-
fending US interests have changed 
very little. While there has been some 
development of military doctrine in 
regard to military operations below 
the level of war because of new tech-
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nological and other developments 
(such as increasing mobility of mili-
tary units, better communications, 
electronization of battle, and an in-
creased role of air power) the basic 
military approaches to Third World 
conflict have hardly changed. The 
terminology has been highly unstable, 
elements of doctrine were developed, 
refined (or lessons learned forgotten), 
but the basic principles of counterin-
surgency remained the same, while 
counterinsurgency and related con-
cepts were and still are the most im-
portant and most frequent types of 
military operations. 
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The conclusion we can deduct 
obviously is that the ideological set-
tings coloured and influenced mili-
tary thinking and strategy, but that 
they were of little importance com-
pared to the stable practice of US mili-
tary intervention and the approaches 
in carrying them out. If US interven-
tions and their strategies hardly 
change over time and happen inde-
pendently of their ideological context, 
these ideological contexts cannot ex-
plain these interventions and their 
character. Therefore, while the respec-
tive ideologies justifying US military 
policies should be taken seriously as 
mechanisms of legitimation, they 
were hardly ever the underlying rea-
sons for interventions. They were 
justifications of a more deeply rooted 
and stable policy of interventionism, 
which is based on a stable set of self-
interest, rarely ever discussed in mili-
tary handbooks, not ideology. The 
common denominator is the constant 
desire to control and dominate a for-
eign country or region, while the justi-
fications have varied widely. 
6.3 The Integration of Military 
and Political Approaches? – 
The Question of Military 
Dominance 
From Small Wars to MOOTW 
and “Stability and Support Opera-
tions”, doctrine has always empha-
sized the political character of these 
operations. The goals are political 
(stabilizing and/or controlling a for-
eign society); the strategies also are 
(e.g. separating insurgents from the 
population, “winning hearts and 
minds”, winning the “legitimacy 
war”25), and many important opera-
tional elements and tactics are basi-
cally political (civic action, civilian 
operations, information operations, 
PSYOP, support to civilian govern-
ments or nation-building); while the 
key actors often are military. The re-
sult is that the line between military 
and civilian operations becomes 
blurred and that the areas of politics 
and the military are hard to distin-
guish.  
In a sense this could in princi-
ple contribute towards “civilizing” 
military operations, because they are 
supposed to be integrated into a holis-
tic approach to dealing with violent 
conflict. Officially it is occasionally 
even recognized that insurgencies and 
other types of MOOTW cannot be 
mastered militarily, but only politi-
cally, socially and economically, while 
military operations are in a subservi-
ent role. Such reasoning can provide 
military officers with an enlightened 
view of their own role and reduce the 
importance of the means and applica-
tion of violence. Practically, however, 
the disappearing of the border be- 
 
                                                     
25  A term used by Manwaring 2001: 19. 
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tween the civil/political and military 
spheres and their melting into one 
often leads to the “militarization” of 
civilian and political activities, be-
cause they can easily become subju-
gated to the security and military as-
pects of a situation. In the words of 
General Zinni, quoted above, civilian 
operations tend to be reduced to be a 
“tactical organization doing basic hu-
manitarian care and interaction with 
the civilian population” done by the 
military forces themselves or under 
the guidance of the armed forces. LIC, 
MOOTW and Counterinsurgency 
cannot be non-political. But from a 
practical perspective, for military 
planners and commanders the politi-
cal dimensions have three characteris-
tics: one, they tend to put them in a 
very delicate position they cannot con-
trol and can hardly shape or influence; 
two, political considerations can be a 
restriction on their own operations, 
reducing the means and limiting the 
tactics of operations, for instance by 
excluding the use of specific weap-
onry, limiting the amount of fire-
power, or determining or restricting 
targeting. Three, political, civilian 
activities can be instrumental to 
achieving military goals. For example, 
to kill insurgents efficiently soldiers 
are supposed to physically separate 
them from civilian populations, and 
to achieve this, political means might 
be employed. To be a good warrior, 
sometimes it may be helpful to use 
developmental or psychological tools. 
This does not transform a warrior into 
a politician, but it makes him more 
efficient.  
The key question here is who is 
in the driver’s seat: is a potential or 
acute conflict in a specific country 
primarily treated as a political and 
developmental problem handled by 
the respective local and foreign civil-
ian authorities and organizations, 
which can turn to the military for 
support and assistance; or is the op-
eration primarily a military one, util-
izing civilian tools, concepts and or-
ganizations? Both cases exist, but 
there is a general tendency to give the 
leading role in countries of high prior-
ity to the military (or to some degree 
or in some respect to the CIA), as in 
Vietnam, Central America in the 
1980s, and Somalia, Afghanistan, and 
Iraq. This will happen the more easily 
the more difficult the security situa-
tion is in a given target country, since 
economic and social development, the 
strengthening of the structures of 
governance and political reform all 
require a minimum degree of secu-
rity. And the worse the security situa-
tion is, the stronger will be the role of 
police, intelligence and military 
forces. A dominating role of the 
armed forces will also depend on 
budgetary considerations: especially 
in the US context it is generally much 
easier to get funding for the military 
than for civilian development and 
humanitarian agencies, which often 
tends to shift the balance of power to 
the former, thereby reducing the role 
of the latter. In such a context it is 
difficult to avoid reducing political 
and civilian elements in MOOTW to a 
supporting and tactical tool for secu-
rity, combat and military activities.  
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To summarize this point: while 
military doctrine in regard to 
MOOTW and related activities often 
demands the primacy of political and 
developmental dimensions over mili-
tary operations, and an integration of 
politics, economics, development, and 
military strategy into a holistic con-
cept, this is rarely accomplished. 
There are several reasons for this:  
a)  Military doctrine often is not se-
rious itself about these two 
points and its general and some-
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times vague statements in this 
regard are generally not followed 
up and transformed into specif-
ics. If political considerations, de-
tailed knowledge of the target 
country and its culture, state- 
and Nation-Building and win-
ning the hearts and minds of the 
local population are really as im-
portant as military doctrine 
states, why do the respective 
field manuals not provide spe-
cific guidance and advice for 
planning in this regard?  
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b)  Over time there seems to have 
occurred a subtle shift in doctrine 
development to deemphasize po-
litical and development aspects. 
While during the last 25 years we 
can see a remarkable stability in 
doctrine, conventional military 
thinking has slowly recaptured 
lost ground.  
c)  Another aspect is the weakness 
of civilian agencies in many 
situations of LIC/MOOTW/Sta-
bility Operations: in regard to 
budgets, personnel, credibility, 
very often development agencies 
are in a much weaker position 
than military ones. While there 
have been quite a few cases 
where the armed forces are call-
ing the shots in a target country 
and in counterinsurgency opera-
tions, it is difficult to imagine 
USAID or another developmen-
tal organization being the lead 
agency. There is a trend in US 
political circles to think “if it is 
important, send in the troops”. 
And if one calls in the troops, it is 
expected that they are in control. 
d)  Vague, unrealistic, propagandis-
tic or contradictory political 
guidance is also undercutting ci-
vilian MOOTW and related op-
erations. If the White House or 
the State Department do not 
formulate clear and attainable 
objectives and put civilian agen-
cies in charge, the result will be 
that the relevant players have to 
sort them out themselves, mud-
dle through in difficult situa-
tions, and will compete for influ-
ence. It is not surprising that the 
armed forces under such condi-
tions will act in ways that suit 
their own bureaucratic culture 
and focus on what they can do 
best: military operations in a nar-
row sense. If the political leaders 
are not forcing the military to act 
in a political and development-
oriented way, the armed forces 
will instinctively try not to get 
involved there more than neces-
sary. They will put the non-
military job on the doorstep of 
civilian agencies, which in turn 
generally do not get the political 
support and the funding to suc-
ceed. Getting funding for re-
sponse to an acute crisis is rela-
tively easy compared to getting it 
before a crisis turns violent, or 
for conflict prevention. And in 
the case of a violent crisis, the 
military will get the biggest part 
of the pie.  
e)  A final problem to assure a mili-
tarization of MOOTW and Coun-
terinsurgency can be the security 
situation in a target country. If 
the security situation is difficult 
or bad, civilian agencies might 
not be able to work effectively. 
This could easily contribute to 
shifting responsibility to the mili-
tary. 
Taken together, the result may 
be an unpleasant choice between ei-
ther military dominance of opera-
tions, or stagnation and paralysis. But 
the military literature does not seem 
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to be interested in dealing with this 
structural problem. 
6.4 Reform and Development – 
Can the Military be the Key 
Player? 
If we have to conclude that US 
military forces in MOOTW and coun-
terinsurgency operations generally 
call the shots in most operations that 
are not just routine and low-key, the 
obvious question is whether they are 
able to do what they are supposed to 
do and what they themselves think 
has to be done. In the analysis of the 
US Marine Corps and the US Army, 
as we have seen above, counterinsur-
gency and some other types of 
MOOTW and Stability Operations are 
caused by serious political and socio-
economic grievances and a state and 
system of governance which is un-
willing, deficient or incompetent to 
deal with these. The function of the 
armed forces in dealing with such a 
situation, as we have mentioned be-
fore, is described as follows: “The 
regular armed forces are the shield 
behind which political, social, and 
economic development occurs” (US 
Department of the Army 2003: 3-6). 
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Thus, the primary process to 
resolve potential or acute violent 
situations in MOOTW, Stability Op-
erations and counterinsurgency is 
creating functioning systems of gov-
ernance and organizing successful 
social and economic development. In 
the Field Manuals quoted sometimes 
the overall process necessary is called 
Nation-Building. 
The Army and Marine Corps 
have and can have very little compe- 
tence in these areas. The troops and 
officers are trained in techniques of 
warfare, in fighting, in organizing and 
applying violence, and in operations 
facilitating those, not in organizing 
political processes, building state in-
stitutions, creating jobs and imple-
menting land reform, to give but a 
few examples. The obvious deficits 
are not just a lack of expertise, train-
ing and experience in these areas, but 
also a different mentality and organ-
izational culture, and a contradiction 
between the roles of warrior on the 
one hand, and development expert, 
diplomat, economist, and administra-
tor on the other. It is not a realistic 
suggestion to transform the armed 
forces into an organization capable of 
such an ambitious undertaking. It also 
would open new problems, like a 
further weakening of civilian agencies 
compared to the military, and possi-
bly lead to an increased militarization 
of development.  
Manwaring in a study for the 
Strategic Study Institute of the US 
Army War College has characterized 
the culture and tradition of the armed 
forces like this:  
“In the tradition of the American way of war, 
civilian and military leaders thought that 
“kicking ass” and destroying the enemy mili-
tary force was the goal of policy. Military vio-
lence was the principal tool” (Manwaring 
2001: 5). 
It is easy to understand that 
with a general mentality like this im-
plementing political and economic 
reform is difficult. And while there 
have always been outstanding indi-
vidual officers talented in non-
military and nation-building opera-
tions, institutionally the Army and 
Marine Corps are at a loss there. 
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6.5 The Role of Development 
Policy and NGOs in 
MOOTW and Stability 
Operations 
Development and humanitar-
ian organizations, state and non-
governmental, local, foreign and in-
ternational, often find themselves in a 
difficult situation. Whether they like it 
or not, an intelligent military force in 
MOOTW will try to integrate them 
into its own strategy of pacification 
and counterinsurgency, and try to 
utilize them in a supporting role. 
Even if these civilian agencies are not 
willing to be used in that way and are 
sceptical about open und direct coop-
eration and coordination with mili-
tary units, there is not very much they 
can do against being instrumental-
ized. On the one hand their role de-
pends to a high degree on stability 
and security in a target country, 
which can invite or even force NGOs 
to cooperate or coordinate with the 
military. On the other hand their suc-
cessful operation might contribute to 
creating basic social services, neces-
sary infrastructure and economic de-
velopment, which tends to favour the 
existing political framework and pro-
duce legitimacy for those in power – if 
it is not explicitly being done in oppo-
sition to the powers that be, which is 
difficult for various reasons and not 
always advisable. Also, very often the 
NGOs receive a considerable part of 
the funding from the very govern-
ments conducting counterinsurgency 
and other operations below the level 
of war in a given country. There are 
many historical examples: El Salvador 
in the 1980s, Afghanistan since the 
war and overthrow of the Taliban in 
late 2001 are only two well-known 
cases, where the US government was 
or is providing considerable sums of 
money to NGOs for humanitarian and 
Nation-Building work, which fits 
neatly into Counterinsurgency or Sta-
bility Operations. It is difficult for 
many NGOs to decline the funding, 
but by providing it, the Government 
has a tool to set the agenda and gently 
steer NGOs into the framework of 
MOOTW. 
NGOs are not in a strong posi-
tion in this regard, and they are of 
little influence compared to govern-
ments and the US military in these 
cases. But at least civilian develop-
ment agencies and NGOs should re-
flect upon their own direct and indi-
rect role in MOOTW contexts, and not 
operate naively without understand-
ing their intended and unintended 
contributions to a military campaign 
(Schade 2005: 125-135). 
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6.6 Security versus Nation-
Building – Contradictions 
between Military and 
Civilian Policies 
To explain one of the most im-
portant problems of counterinsur-
gency we first have to briefly summa-
rize the core strategy.  
The overall goal of MOOTW 
and “Stability and Support Opera-
tions”, especially in counterinsur-
gency is generally to stabilize or re-
construct a political status quo and 
government where this serves US 
interests. The decisive strategic ap-
proach to achieve this is to win the 
loyalty and trust of the population, to 
win its hearts and minds, and to “win 
the legitimacy war”. If this is done 
successfully, most other elements of 
counterinsurgency can also be 
achieved, including isolating the in-
surgents and beating them politically 
and militarily. If this strategic objec-
tive cannot be achieved, counterin-
surgency can get extremely messy, 
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will drag on for potentially a very 
long time, and chances for success are 
dim. To win the respect and loyalty of 
the population, propaganda and Psy-
chological Operations are not enough, 
and combat operations are of secon-
dary importance and might even 
backfire, but the key to success is po-
litical, social and economic reform. 
The population will only support the 
government if it reduces the causes of 
conflict which feed the insurgency. 
The important question is which side 
of the conflict is being perceived as 
more credibly correcting the defects of 
the respective society. These ills can 
be very different in different contexts, 
but corruption, repression, incompe-
tence, nepotism, neglect, unnecessary 
poverty and deep social and economic 
divides can be major factors. The role 
of the state and creating a functioning 
and responsive system of governance 
are crucial. We have mentioned be-
fore that armed forces are not exactly 
the instrument of choice for getting 
such a reform program in place.  
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What is important here is a cru-
cial strategic dilemma. US forces in-
volved in MOOTW cannot succeed by 
themselves, but need local support, 
or, more precisely, they need local 
partners (local civilian and security 
state institutions) to undertake such 
an ambitious program of reform, 
which they in turn can support by 
civilian and military means.  
As long as this precondition for 
success is present, counterinsurgency 
and stability operations (and some 
other types of MOOTW) can be rela-
tively easy and clean activities. But 
what happens when this precondition 
is lacking or completely absent, which 
it often is? 
One situation where this is the 
case can be a context of a failed state 
or of military occupation of a foreign 
country, like in Somalia or Iraq. If 
there is no functioning local state, US 
forces have nothing to support. Their 
main job then might become to gov-
ern directly and re-create an effective 
state, responsive to local needs, which 
still accepts US guidance. Besides the 
tremendous complexity and difficulty 
of this task and a lack of competence 
in this field another major problem 
often arises: The first priority for oc-
cupying forces has to be the security 
of their own personnel, both military 
and civilian – which leads to policies 
in contradiction to the state-building 
and Nation-Building job at hand. Oc-
cupation of a foreign country in failed 
or conquered states necessarily re-
quires security to be the main objec-
tive of the occupying force, which 
undercuts the re-building of local 
governance, the conducting of politi-
cal, social and economic reconstruc-
tion and reform. US forces will often 
find themselves in a dilemma to 
choose between the need for immedi-
ate security and stability on the one 
hand and medium and long-term 
political development. To put it 
bluntly: the key contradiction here is 
between the imperial dimension of 
military policies on the one hand, 
aiming at foreign control of the local 
society and the local state, and suc-
cessful Nation-Building on the other, 
which requires local ownership of the 
project and political reform, institu-
tion-building, which often are re-
stricted exactly by imperial domina-
tion and control. “Unity of objective” 
and a clear and non-contradictory set 
of goals of MOOTW are hardly possi-
ble there, which undermines a key 
condition for success. The problem 
just highlighted does not completely 
exclude success of US policies in fa-
vourable and special circumstances 
(like in Germany and Japan after 
World War II), but in many Third 
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World environments which are often 
fragmented it presents a formidable 
hurdle.  
A second situation occurs when 
a local state does exist, but is either 
unwilling or unable to undertake the 
necessary reform – which implies self-
reform – or even is the main center of 
the political or socio-economic prob-
lems that started and still feed the 
insurgency. Sometimes an inefficient 
or incompetent, politically non-
responsive and repressive or exploita-
tive state is the main problem which 
has led to the conflict and widespread 
resistance. To support such a gov-
ernment might stabilize the situation 
for some time, but it will also stabilize 
or strengthen the reasons for the in-
surgency. It is not a way out, but the 
institutionalization of a stalemate. 
Recognizing this point, US Army 
Field Manual 100-20 (“Operations in 
Low-Intensity Conflict”, 1990) stated 
quite clearly: 
60 
“The [local: J.H.] government often must 
overcome the inertia and incompetence of its 
own political system before it can cope with 
the insurgency against this system” (US De-
partment of the Army and the Air Force 1990: 
2-8). 
Weakness and incompetence of 
a host government indeed can be cru-
cial Achilles' heels of successful coun-
terinsurgency. But it is not enough to 
just mention organizational and tech-
nical deficiencies, which by them-
selves can already cripple a campaign. 
Sometimes, local governments may 
not only lack strength and compe-
tence, but also will. They might not 
agree with the need for reform be-
cause of political, psychological or 
cultural reasons and prefer a “military 
solution” to an insurgency, especially 
when they are sure of the support of 
the United States. A host government 
might feel its power or means of cor-
ruption threatened by political re-
form, and therefore foil any attempt at 
change. And it is also possible that a 
host government is not just unable or 
unwilling to deal with the problems 
of internal instability or insurgency, 
but because of its policies or practices 
is even the root cause of the problem. 
A repressive, exploitative and non-
responsive government might cause 
exactly the problems a reform pro-
gram is supposed to solve.  
To support such a regime puts 
the US military at the side of a repres-
sive and incompetent government, 
and discredits the operation in the 
eyes of a majority of the population. 
Stabilisation of repression, dictator-
ship, or a non-responsive regime 
might appear to serve US national 
interests, but it will easily lose the 
“war for legitimacy” and put US 
troops in a very difficult situation. 
Generally, the US political leadership 
(DOS, NSC, CIA, the President or his 
representatives) and to some degree 
the US military will try to convince, 
influence, pressure or blackmail the 
local government into reform, but this 
is far from easy. The respective gov-
ernment, some of its members, or oth-
ers from the political elite might re-
sist, because it can often hurt their 
interests. An example of the US mili-
tary trying to argue for political re-
form is given by Lt. Col. Charles 
Hasskamp: 
“For example, on a US military-to-military 
assistance visit to Chad in 1996, the American 
contingent was attempting to convince the 
Chad armed forces leadership that they 
should use their country’s military resources 
to improve Chad’s social, economic, and po-
litical stability by doing public works and 
civil affairs. Chad military personnel, trained 
as traditional, elitist warriors, refused even to 
talk about such proposals” (Hasskamp 1998: 
1). 
Also, US pressure for reform 
will often be less than impressive, 
since the US might want some reform 
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to make the status quo function, but it 
does not want to further undermine 
the local government, since its goal is 
stability. Too much reform might 
weaken the power of the local elites, 
on which the US strategy has to rely 
for the reasons mentioned above. The 
key problem here is a contradiction 
between the interests in stability on 
the one hand, and in dealing with the 
causes of instability. While reducing the 
causes of instability will lead to 
greater stability in the long run, in the 
short term it might even increase in-
stability. To tackle the causes of insta-
bility will often require shifting the 
balance of power in a target county, 
and even to weaken or take power 
away from a ruling elite – which can 
be exactly the local partner the US 
needs to cooperate and might want to 
stabilize. Therefore, a US demand for 
reform will often only be made half-
heartedly and not be too serious, since 
it might be necessary in the long run, 
but undercut US interest in the short 
term.  
“Washington must recognize that its allies, 
including those in the security forces, are of-
ten the source of the problem as well as the 
heart of any solution. [...] The nature of re-
gimes and of societies feeds an insurgency, 
but the United States is often hostage to its 
narrow goals with regard to counterinsur-
gency and thus becomes complicit in the 
host-nation’s self-defeating behavior” (By-
man 2005: V). 
The documents quoted above 
have tried to find a way out of this 
dilemma. They have stressed that in 
the context of counterinsurgency, to 
win over a population it is necessary 
to create the perception of change, to 
inspire hope in the people. This obvi-
ously is different from real change 
and not necessarily identical with 
redistributing power. While some 
change is necessary to create hope 
and the perception that the situation 
will improve, if the US and its local 
allies are satisfied with changing per-
ceptions instead of solving the deeper 
causes of resistance, the temptation 
will be to combine reformist rhetoric 
with more conservative policies. This 
might work for a short period of time, 
but after a while lead to further dis-
appointment and resentment.  
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Daniel Byman in a recent re-
search paper has pointedly summa-
rized our point:  
 
Jochen Hippler 
 
7. Concluding Remarks: 
Political Context and Possible Further Areas 
of Research 
Both military analysts and aca-
demics have pointed out that over the 
last decades inter-state war has de-
creased in numbers, while intra-state 
violence and war has become much 
more frequent. It is difficult to dispute 
this analysis. But we have to conclude 
that at the same time the distinction 
between internal and inter-state war 
has become blurred. The discussion in 
this paper has demonstrated that the 
US armed forces (and with it, the US 
government) have long developed 
strategies and practices that aim at 
militarily supporting US interests in 
the internal conflicts in foreign countries 
in combat and non-combat opera-
tions. This implies that in many of 
these operations the organized vio-
lence is neither inter-state, nor exclu-
sively or primarily intra-state in char-
acter, but combining elements of both. 
LIC, MOOTW and Stability and Sup-
port Operations do include elements 
of inter-state violence below the level 
of war (like unilateral, external sup-
port for insurgents, in some cases 
counterterrorism, and others) since 
US forces are foreign governmental, 
external actors. Other operations 
combine intra-state conflict or war 
with foreign intervention (like in 
counterinsurgency and other types of 
operations). It should be obvious that 
any military role of US forces in a 
third country by definition adds an 
inter-state dimension, even if the con-
flict had been an internal affair before. 
It would be advisable therefore to 
broaden the two categories (intra-
state vs. inter state war) to at least 
three, to include foreign interventions 
in internal violent conflicts, or an in-
ternationalization of internal war.  
This paper has tried to familiar-
ize non-military analysts with the 
doctrines and strategies of the US 
armed forces in regard to regional 
conflicts, providing overviews on 
historical Small Wars concepts, Low-
Intensity Conflict (LIC), Operations 
Other than War (MOOTW), and Sta-
bility Operations, and especially em-
phasising Counterinsurgency. While 
it clearly is not a priority to academic 
research to analyse military strategies 
as such and for their own sake, mili-
tary forces, and especially US forces, 
are key players in many local and 
regional conflicts. It is important to be 
aware of their strategies to realisti-
cally understand the respective dy-
namics of conflicts where they are 
involved, the policies, effects, and 
problems of military US interventions. 
It has also been shown that military 
concepts in some regards reflect a 
reasonable understanding of conflicts 
and insurgencies in general, while 
often ignoring these insights in prac-
tice. The main reason for this is not 
the obvious deficiency of soldiers in 
dealing with non-military tasks and 
other weaknesses, though these are 
important, but the contradiction be-
tween the imperial roles of an armed 
force serving US strategic interest 
abroad, and the need for political and 
economic development, which often 
runs counter to these interests.  
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It is important whether the US 
armed forces, as major actors in vio-
lent conflicts around the world, pos- 
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sess a realistic and mature under-
standing of these conflicts. It is also 
quite relevant whether the US mili-
tary has a clear and feasible concept of 
how to act, free of basic contradictions 
and of wishful thinking. Putting 
highly armed troops into a potentially 
or acute violent context with vague or 
shifting objectives and without a real-
istic and functioning strategy is a sure 
road to disaster – not just from a US 
perspective, but especially for the 
population and society of a target 
country. Confused soldiers are dan-
gerous and destructive. But this does 
not imply that clear objectives and 
appropriate strategies for the military 
are enough. On the contrary, very 
often, they are not. If the civilian lead-
ership in Washington decides to un-
dertake useless, wrong, or illegal mili-
tary operations, doing them with a 
high degree of professionalism might 
be better than making them even 
worse by acting incompetently and 
contradictorily, but they still would 
be useless, wrong, or illegal under 
international law. Doing a bad or stu-
pid thing competently and with great 
commitment does not make it right. 
For instance, it is quite obvious that 
the Vietnam War was waged with a 
lot of wishful thinking, bad strategiz-
ing, confused objectives and with a 
deep misunderstanding of the charac-
ter of the war. Technical competence 
never does help against strategic 
blindness. But this was of secondary 
importance. The key points were that 
the war served to support corrupt, 
incompetent, repressive and unpopu-
lar governments in South Vietnam, 
that it was in several regards in disre-
gard to international obligations, that 
it was basically an extension of the 
French colonial war, and that it was 
justified and explained to the interna-
tional and US publics by ideological 
hogwash and outright lies. If the war 
would have been conducted “better” 
and counterinsurgency doctrine ap-
plied earlier instead of conventional 
strategies of attrition, the war would 
still have been both morally and po-
litically wrong. There is nothing mili-
tary strategies and Military Opera-
tions Other than War can do about 
this.  
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and it was based on propaganda, lies, 
and wishful thinking. A less incompe-
tent way of planning and implement-
ing of the post-war occupation could 
have done nothing to correct this. 
Still, it might have reduced the suffer-
ing of the Iraqi people and reduced 
the danger of the country sliding into 
violence and civil war. Taken to-
gether, when analyzing military 
strategies for MOOTW and counterin-
surgency, we have to keep in mind 
that their context is completely de-
pendent on the political decisions of 
the civilian leadership, and that po-
litical context is often decisive. When 
US foreign and security policy is 
driven by imperial designs and an 
unilateral impulse towards “showing 
small nations the way they should 
go” (in the word of Maj. Ellis, quoted 
above) this is the main problem, not 
some positive or negative aspect in 
military doctrine.  
Still, with this in mind it is im-
portant to understand how counterin-
surgency and other Military Opera-
tions Other than War are conceptual-
ized and conducted by the US mili-
tary forces. In this paper we had to 
focus on some basic points of military 
doctrine. Many important aspects had 
to be ignored. It would be worthwhile 
to conduct further research on other 
elements of the strategies discussed, 
like Counterterrorism, Peace Opera-
tions, and possibly Humanitarian 
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Assistance operations and Pro-
Insurgency, to deepen our under-
standing of US military operations in 
regional conflicts. It is obvious that 
especially after September 11, 2001 
and the “Global War on Terrorism” 
the question of US military ap-
proaches to Counterterrorism is of 
high relevance, while peace opera-
tions will also remain of considerable 
importance. All of this is part of 
MOOTW doctrine, but could not be 
dealt with here. On a different level of 
analysis, it might be illuminating to 
have a much more detailed look at 
some of the concepts included in all 
types of operations that influence 
civilian activities and politics in re-
gard to conflict, like military ap-
proaches to dealing with the local and 
international media, with NGOs, psy-
chological operations, and with civil-
military relations and civic action.  
Academic research, humanitarian 
activism, and the reporting of journal-
ists on regional conflicts, civilian 
peace-building and conflict preven-
tion could benefit from a better un-
derstanding of these topics. Finally, it 
would be an important task to analyse 
the practical experiences of applying 
MOOTW and counterinsurgency doc-
trine in specific key cases, like Viet-
nam, El Salvador, Haiti, Afghanistan 
and Iraq. While there is a wealth of 
literature on case studies of US inter-
ventions, it would be fruitful to con-
nect them more explicitly to the 
strategizing of the US military, search 
for the lessons learned and focus on 
their impact for doctrine development 
(see Duncan 1998). It might be an in-
teresting question to ask why, when 
and how the lessons learned by US 
forces have not been applied or even 
forgotten. 
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